By Bhartendu Kumar Singh
A major national security challenge that the government would face in this tenure is the momentous developments in Chinese military preparedness affecting the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and the Indo-Pacific area. While China’s military modernisation has been an ongoing process for the last few decades (and so has been India’s defensive response), its pace has accelerated in recent times. The LAC that was ‘relatively peaceful’ until a decade ago, has metamorphosed into an active front with looming war threats. Unless deftly handled, the bilateral military power balance would soon become too asymmetrical and may critically imperil the LAC sanctity.
Much of the current modernisation goals for the PLA were finalised in the 20th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2022. The military dimension of the Report to the Congress focused on ‘intensifying and accelerating the PLA’s modernisation goals’. Accordingly, by 2027, the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) is to aim towards finishing its first phase of modernisation process. This is the time when the PLA would have completed 100 years of its foundation. The second phase of military modernisation would complete by 2035. By 2049, China aims to metamorphose its PLA into a world-class armed force capable of out rightly taking on the US military muscle in the Indo-Pacific region.
Even while 2027 is still a couple of years ahead, we can already see many visible and demonstrative changes in countless aspects of the PLA’s force modernisation. For instance, China has successfully completed the reorganisation of its PLA into integrated theater commands since 2016 and is running with an eight-year advantage. The Western Theater Command, headquartered at Chengdu, has been quite active through construction of roads, rails and new settlement colonies near the LAC. One only has to visit the Chinese Ministry of Defence website to get a first-hand glimpse of the day-to-day developments on military logistics and advancements, whether in Western Theater Command or elsewhere.
While there are many sources of information on Chinese military developments, probably the most accurate reporting about Chinese military developments on an updated basis is published by the US Department of Defence. Called the Annual Report to the Congress on ‘Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China’, the 2023 version brings out some major policy and logistics developments related to the PLA not covered succinctly elsewhere. For example, the report adequately exposes the offensive aspects of China’s so-called ‘active defence’ policy. Similarly, since 2022, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) appears to have been increasingly using the term ‘integrated national strategic systems and capabilities’. On the weapons front, China has moved quite ahead with deployment of hypersonic weapons. By 2027, China would have achieved substantial progress in the field of mechanisation, informatisation, and intelligentisation of its armed forces.
China is also making commendable progress in many other areas that are going to affect its military modernization in the coming days. For instance, the Chinese realise that military innovation is the key to maintain an edge in military modernisation and dominate neighbouring rivals. President Xi Jinping has launched an innovation-driven defence development strategy (IDDS). China is resorting less to ‘reverse engineering’ of foreign weapons as was the case in the past and has invested heavily in high tech weapons. Techno-nationalism has played a key role in the expansion and consolidation of its domestic military industrial complex (MIC). Similarly, China’s progress in artificial intelligence and robotics is much better than many countries. It is gainfully deploying robots in mundane soldiering duties and counter-terrorism operations.
Apart from the conventional build-up of forces, China has also resorted to, in recent times, what Fiona S Cunningham of University of Pennsylvania calls as ‘strategic substitution’. China is using information-age weapons such as cyber operations to enhance its strategic leverage and coercive powers. While China is using this as ‘an increasingly capable instrument of state craft’ against the US, India is not immune to Chinese subtle adventures. For example, it is said that Chinese cyber-attacks were behind the Mumbai power grid failure of March 2021. In February 2024, the Washington Post reported that Chinese intelligence and cyber-surveillance accessed 95.2 gigabytes of Indian immigration data. These are just representative examples. The actual quantum of attacks from the Chinese cyber hackers spans across different sectors, including financial markets.
In the coming days, the LAC itself would witness increased activities on the Chinese side. The Chinese PLA may increase the frequency and intensity of coercive and risky operations near the LAC. There could be more military exercises and force mobilisation in a teasing manner. Concurrently, China would try to wean away Bhutan through border agreement without involving India. It would also bring Nepal closer through project finalisation and financing of railways extension from the Tibet side to Kathmandu. Finally, we may see more espionage activities from the Chinese side into Indian territories!
The LAC would, therefore, remain an area of utmost national security concern to India. Unfortunately, strategic experts and military planners in India remain caught in a binary about national security challenges emanating from China. Against the long, real and perpetuating threat from the Chinese aggressive posturing on the LAC, we are often told about a larger threat emanating from China’s increasing footsteps in the Bay of Bengal and the wider Indian Ocean region. While there is no doubt that the Chinese are making increasing maritime forays near India’s southern waters, we are perhaps making the mistake of treating both the threats on the same level-playing platform. Outright confrontation with China on the oceanic front will only mean more diversion of scarce defence logistics and resources.
Fortunately, at the policy level, India’s defensive preparations against Chinese military development near the LAC has been calibrated, thoughtful and on the right trajectory. The border infrastructure has improved with new roads and more are in offing! Realising that technology is the key to rise in great power status along with robust defence preparedness, India has been investing in military technology and innovation. However, getting inputs about China’s military developments from western sources may not sub-serve our knowledge requirements. The focus of the Pentagon annual report on Chinese military developments, for example, is on the PLA’s force mobilisation along the Taiwan Straits. These reports do not focus on LAC and touch them only tangentially. Thus, we may be certainly missing out on many important military developments across the LAC. Probably, it is time for an indigenous assessment of Chinese military developments on a regular basis.
The author is in the Indian Defence Accounts Service.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal and do not reflect the official position or policy of FinancialExpress.com Reproducing this content without permission is prohibited.
