Air India’s steady performance in the first week of December stood in sharp contrast to IndiGo’s mass cancellations, underscoring two very different approaches of transition planning to tougher flight duty time limitation (FDTL) norms. As IndiGo cancelled around 1,900 flights between December 1 and 5, the Tata-owned airline group passed the test with minimal disruption, showing how early compliance, moderated ambition and a realistic reading of the new rules allowed it to succeed where IndiGo failed.
When did the divergence begin then exactly?
The divergence began months earlier. While IndiGo increased winter departures by nearly 10% to over 15,000 weekly flights, Air India chose restraint, trimming its winter schedule by 2%. That single decision created the cushion the group needed when FDTL rules took effect from December 1. Air India’s weekly departures fell slightly year-on-year to 7,448, while IndiGo pushed to its highest-ever schedule, only to find itself operating far beyond what its pilot strength could support under the new regime.
The rules themselves were not a surprise. The DGCA had flagged the need for higher weekly rest, reduced night landings and tighter caps on night flying months in advance. For an airline running high utilisation and steep network growth, these changes demanded deeper staffing buffers. IndiGo had little to offer.
Understanding IngiGo’s operational machinery
At the heart of its meltdown lay chronic under-hiring. IndiGo operates around 410 aircraft but has only 5,700 pilots – roughly 14 per aircraft. On paper the ratio appears viable, but it falls apart when new rest rules demand additional reserve crews. IndiGo’s network stretches across 80 domestic destinations, supported by an aircraft utilisation of 14–15 hours a day and 6–7 flights per aircraft. That model left almost no slack. The airline admitted it maintained only a 4% crew buffer, which evaporated the moment the FDTL changes kicked in. Even by early December, IndiGo acknowledged it needed 2,422 captains but had only 2,357, a shortfall impossible to bridge quickly given the lengthy training and check-ride cycles for command upgrades.
Air India entered the same regulatory environment with more insulation. Its 295-aircraft fleet is served by roughly 3,500 pilots, a lower ratio than IndiGo’s but supported by a very different operational approach: shorter aircraft utilisation, tighter network design and greater in-built redundancy. Air India’s domestic aircraft fly 11–12 hours a day, producing 4–5 flights per aircraft. When the new norms reduced flexibility on night operations, the airline could scale back to 10–11 hours without breaking its schedule. IndiGo, operating close to theoretical maximum efficiency, simply did not have that option.
Network breadth also mattered. Air India and Air India Express serve about 55 domestic destinations through a hub-and-spoke structure centred on Delhi, Mumbai and Bengaluru. The contained layout made it easier to redesign rosters and duty patterns in compliance with the new norms. IndiGo’s sprawling national footprint added complexity in pairing flights, moving crews and maintaining legal duty-time sequences.
Much of Air India’s resilience grew out of decisions taken during and after the group’s post-merger consolidation. The integration of Air India and Vistara in 2024, and Air India Express with AIX Connect earlier the same year, allowed the group to rationalise its network.
Executives say the Tata Group’s five-year, staggered expansion plan is designed precisely to avoid the sort of disruption IndiGo is now battling. By moderating growth and building capacity ahead of demand, the group created a safety margin that proved decisive when the regulatory environment tightened.
