The US nomination for the presidency of the World Bank, and the global media commentary it has triggered, are profoundly disconcerting. Why? Because the Bank?s stature, significance and utility is enhanced or diminished by the stature/calibre of its leader. It is the quality of its president that makes or breaks the Bank. It is not the Bank that makes or breaks the president. There is not much room for learning on the job. The last time the Bank had a leader of global stature, with instant name recognition, was when Robert S McNamara was its president. That period of 1968-81 was the golden age of the Bank. In the 31 years since he resigned, none of his six successors have brought to the Bank what he contributed in terms of vision, verve, credence and performance. Indeed some of them have damaged the Bank, its mission, and its standing, to a degree that may be irreparable. In trying to make the Bank ?everything to everybody? they have nearly succeeded in making it ?nothing to anybody?.

The Bank?s outgoing president has not been appreciated enough for the quiet job he has done in stabilising the institution, and permitting it to find its feet again, after the excesses and failures of his predecessors. He has done it in a low-key, almost unnoticed, but nevertheless effective, manner. Yet, despite his herculean efforts, and those of its capable professional staff, the Bank has been unable to avert a slide into insignificance and, ultimately, irrelevance to the world it serves. That proves that stature of leadership matters! It is sad that, at a time when the World Bank might be of more help than the IMF, EIB or ECB, to restructure the economies of Greece and Portugal over the long-term, no one seriously recognises that reality?obvious though it is!

Any candidate for president of the World Bank must meet five critical tests. First, he/she must be a leader with global name recognition, a reputation for outperformance, and acknowledged accomplishment. That is essential if he/she is to pull his weight as an equal to heads of government and finance ministers in G20 meetings that he is invited to attend ex officio. Second, he/she must have credibility in the world of global finance. The Bank is an integral part of that world?as a borrower, lender, investor, co-financier, risk manager, or product innovator. The president of the Bank has to be recognisable to, and respected by, over 200 governments, central banks, finance ministries, and other multilateral, regional and bilateral financial institutions, and more broadly with global universal and investment banks/funds. People forget, for example, the importance of the enormous contributions that the Bank made to the development of useful financial derivatives, the creation of the repo market in public treasuries, and a number of other major financial innovations in the 1980s that are now taken for granted.

Third, any leader of the Bank must have credibility/acceptability in the world of ?development? and in emerging markets; especially BRICS that will dominate the global economy in the coming decades. He/she must have a clear macroeconomic, financial, political and social understanding of what induces enduring success or failure in fostering ?growth?. Such credibility comes about only with experience with managing large-scale public/private investment, and understanding its impact on development. That knowledge must not be confused with familiarity with ?aid? or the ?aid industry?. Both of these are often anti-developmental in nature and outcome. Fourth, he/she must have credibility with legislatures in the global political world. That is crucial if what the Bank does, and how it does it, is to be more acceptable to its borrowers and lenders than it often seems to be.

Fifth, and finally, any leader of the Bank has to be an administrator and large-institution manager par excellence. Unless they have done it, few people realise how difficult the task is of managing as large and diverse a multilateral institution as the Bank. It?s staff is multi-cultural with almost every nationality/ethnic identity in the world being represented. Those identities have to be respected, yet forged into effective teams that think and act as one. Unlike most organisations, the Bank?s staff are diverse and heterogeneous in a vast array of different disciplines in each of which they are highly educated and qualified. These high-level skill sets have to be integrated effectively in order to foster durable and sustainable development in a dizzying variety of differing national, political and systemic circumstances.

Against these five tests, how do the three official nominees?one from the US and two from the emerging world, measure up? In truth: not well at all. The US nominee fares the worst. The two nominees from the emerging world may be marginally better on one or two counts. There are a number of managing directors, vice-presidents, and department directors in the Bank who might be better qualified for the presidency than any of the three nominees; although none of them would think so. There are better candidates around the world who can and should be nominated for what is (but is not regarded in the US as) one of the most important jobs in the world, and particularly in the multilateral system. Sadly, many of the best qualified would not wish to be considered for the job given the devalued status to which it has sunk. This is a good opportunity to rectify that yawning discrepancy. But, in true form, the US administration seems never to miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. What is surprising is that India and China have put up no nominees when they constitute the largest reservoirs of qualified candidates.

The question that is obscured by current ructions over the Bank?s leadership concerns its future. The world is changing more rapidly than its traditional ?donor? shareholders are willing to recognise and adjust to. Emerging countries are growing increasingly impatient with foot-dragging on overdue changes in its ownership structure. The fused identities of the IBRD (the commercial window) and IDA (the concessional window) of the World Bank Group do much to impede the debt (IBRD) and equity (IFC) providing parts of the Group from working more closely together to achieve development more rapidly in the emerging world of the 21st century.

The IBRD faces the prospect of a steady deterioration in the quality of its portfolio as the BRICS approach graduation; in any event, they do not need to rely on the IBRD as much as it needs to rely on them. The proposal for the creation of a new BRICS bank, along with the growing weight of the Asian and Inter-American banks in their respective regions, are likely to be a few more nails in the coffin of the IBRD. It looks increasingly likely that the World Bank will (inexorably) become a senior, less dysfunctional version of the African Development Bank. These issues, and many others, pose a challenging agenda for any incoming leader. The present nominees are unqualified to address them. For that reason, it is urgent that all the Bank?s shareholders pay more attention to the need for better nominees than those proposed to lead a vital multilateral institution before its slide into oblivion becomes irreversible.

The author is chairman, Oxford International Associates Ltd