As democratic revolts roar across West Asia in a cascading fashion, the word ?jasmine? has entered the blacklist of forbidden terms enforced by China?s Internet censorship and policing machinery. Blogs and video links mentioning this fragrant flower were blocked by China?s ?great firewall? with systematic precision after the ?jasmine revolution? brought down the Ben Ali dictatorship in Tunisia and ignited a region-wide confrontation between despotic states and desperate citizens.
China?s attitude to the ongoing tumult in West Asia has shifted from initial concern about risks to its energy supplies to alarm that the spark lit by courageous youth in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Iran and Bahrain could inspire Chinese people to also seek long-denied multi-party democracy. Having recently witnessed popular mobilisation via social networking tools toppling entrenched regimes, China?s inspired ?netizen? activists have disseminated names of rendezvous spots in over a dozen cities for rallies against the party?s six-decade-long rule.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is responding by rounding up hundreds of dissidents and heightening vigilance. President Hu Jintao convened an emergency huddle of his top brass in which a firm message was relayed to ?reduce inharmonious factors to the minimum?. Official sanction has been given to the state apparatus to ?resolutely correct unhealthy practices?, using all means available. Taking a cue from the Saudi Arabian monarchy, which has advised its conservative allies in the region to launch early, pre-emptive and fearsome violence before the situation goes out of hand, the Chinese authorities are using disproportionate numbers of security forces to crush protests for human rights and democratic freedom.
The CCP survived one previous historical moment of vulnerability as the Cold War came to an end between 1989-91, when democratising fires scalped Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Even though communism collapsed globally at that time, the CCP weathered the storm through a mix of brute force (as in the massacre of Tiananmen Square and quieter crackdowns in its aftermath) and dynamic economic growth. It bears reiteration that the modernising economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping had doubled China?s per capita income between 1978 and 1987, producing a vast constituency of beneficiaries who hesitated to rock the boat by joining angry students and workers.
One of the strategic beliefs guiding the CCP is the correlation between high economic growth and ?social harmony? (a code phrase for regime survival). The idea sounds like a no-brainer: hungry bellies and jobless youth will not tolerate a tyrannical system, but materially satiated and people optimistic of the future will develop loyalty to the rulers and avoid lending a critical mass to the few pro-democracy zealots who will always exist as minor irritants.
So far, the ?jasmine? organisers of China do seem to be in the minority as a result of the party?s success in delivering close to double-digit economic growth, containing unemployment to a mere 4%, and battling inflation with determination?all despite the global downturn since 2008.
But the converse argument has been made in comparative political literature, wherein rising incomes from a low base level can actually threaten autocracies and generate demands for popular representation and respect for liberal human rights. Adam Przeworski of New York University has argued that the probability of authoritarian regimes transitioning to democracy rises as countries approach or cross the ?threshold? per capita income of $4,115. Although a number of exceptions to this widely cited rule exist, China?s nominal per capita GDP is currently within this threshold?s vicinity.
Quantitative analyses miss out on other factors that cause democratisation, including the relative strengths of internal factions within authoritarian regimes and the roles of foreign powers and multinational corporations. Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who knows more than a thing or two about the fall of tyrannies, recently warned autocrats that economic growth cannot ultimately save them because the real problem is ?unaccountable and uncontrolled power?.
China?s own variant of the ?jasmine revolution? could take some time to arrive, but the CCP is after all mortal, just like any other formerly ?stable? autocratic entity that eventually found its expiry date.
?The author is vice-dean of the Jindal School of International Affairs
