While no one can deny that Mani Shankar Aiyar has a tendency to shoot his mouth off, the second part of his controversial statement on the Commonwealth Games (CWG) is relevant for future decisions. ?Basically, I will be very unhappy if the Games are successful because they will start bringing Asian Games, Olympic Games and all these.?
It just so happens that Indian Olympic Association (IOA) has bid for 2019 Asian Games. How much is that going to cost? How much will CWG cost? We don?t know and it is an unfair question to ask. After all, we still don?t know how much Asian Games of 1982 cost. Estimates range between Rs 700-1,000 crore.
We don?t know because there are different types of expenditure?roads and transportation, offices and commercial space, hotels, sports infrastructure, housing, communications and other services. Direct expenditure is difficult to pin down and government window-dressing of accounts doesn?t help. For CWG, we are roughly talking about Rs 140 crore for the bid, Rs 2,100 crore as a central budget allocation for 2010-11, Rs 4,000 crore spent by NDMC and MCD, Rs 400 crore for opening and closing ceremonies, Rs 3,400 crore for constructing and renovating stadiums, Rs 175 crore for the organising committee?s (OC) offices, Rs 500 crore for new parking, Rs 350 crore for streets/footpaths, Rs 1,100 crore for the village, Rs 100 crore for coverage and an additional Rs 15,000 crore spent by Delhi on infrastructure. That?s close to Rs 30,000 crore and there are items one hasn?t included. Plus, there will be cost escalations. So we end up spending close to Rs 40,000 crore. If we spent Rs 700 crore in 1982, Rs 40,000 crore is a more realistic figure than the Rs 3,500 crore that floats around. Capital is scarce in developing countries and opportunity costs of capital are high. Costs of developing infrastructure are also high. Also, revenue sources are scarce. Barring Los Angeles in 1984, there is not a single instance of such mega sports events having generated surpluses.
Therefore, these are public resources, even if sponsorships from PSUs masquerade as non-public sources. While there is no longer any point in asking whether we should have spent Rs 40,000 crore on CWG, we should certainly ask whether we can make better use of such money in the future.
The point isn?t so much corruption, bribery and leakage, instances of which may be surfacing now. If Rs 40,000 crore is being publicly spent, we tend to accept 5% or 10% will be siphoned off. How is it different from the telecom saga? All that has happened is greater opportunity to ?manage, multiply and defend corruption?. Public expenditure implies privatisation of gain. The indignation seems to be more about poor delivery, across the multiplicity of IOA, OC (with its 24 sub-committees), MCD, NDMC, DDA and sports ministry. By all accounts, the Asian Games special organising committee (AGSOC) of 1982 was more efficient and successful, though it is also true that external scrutiny (including media) was less then. Following the sports minister, everyone now uses image of the great Indian wedding, with a wonderful event pulled off at the last minute. There will be resort to Indian technique of ?jugaad?. In fairness, there were hiccups in 1982, too (Talkatora swimming pool, players? building) and allegations of violations of planning norms and regulations.
The key is so-called ?legacy? effects, highlighted in India?s bid document too and invariably mentioned by proponents of mega sports events like CWG. There is the intangible of prestige. On tangibles, there is plenty of cross-country research available. And these show limited and almost non-existent legacy effects on sporting performance, tourism and subsequent use of sports infrastructure.
This is true of 1982 Asian Games also. What have we done with Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium, Talkatora Stadium, Indira Gandhi Indoor Stadium and Yamuna Velodrome? How many weddings, film-type functions and rallies are there going to be? Real, as opposed to imagined, legacy effects are restricted to improvements in transportation (Munich 1972, Seoul 1988, Barcelona 1992, Beijing 2008), housing (Munich 1972, Los Angeles 1984, Atlanta 1996) and by extrapolation, urban planning. For Delhi in 1982, this meant sports village, hotels (Kanishka, Maurya Sheraton, Taj Palace), flyovers (Moolchand, Sewa Nagar, Oberoi) and roads (Ring Road). The Siri Fort area, and much of South Delhi, owes its development to 1982 and the influx of unskilled labour into Delhi also received a stimulus. However, a counter-factual question remains. Wouldn?t these have happened had there been no Asian Games in 1982? Wouldn?t we have had colour television without them? We probably would have. It is just that rigid deadlines meant such infrastructure expenditure didn?t have time over-runs, though cost over-runs are different. At best, this highlights the inertia of normal government decision-making and is a poor argument for CWG. Wouldn?t Delhi metro have happened without CWG? As in other countries, there is also the broader issue of whether expenditure geared towards to a mega sports event meshes into urban planning for any city, or bypasses it and leads to selective development in enclaves. Delhi may, or may not, become a world-class city in October 2010. But 50% of that Rs 40,000 crore would still have been spent and Delhi in October 2010 would have been different, had it not been for CWG.
?The author is a noted economist
