Whatever else the Commonwealth Games will achieve, they have been an utter disaster for India?s international reputation. Apart from the allegations of corruption, the gross mismanagement of the process and the cavalier attitude of those responsible have made India the laughing stock of the world.

One painful reminder of how things could be done better, albeit at a small scale, stems from my interactions with the thoroughly professional eastern European workmen that are currently renovating my home. I wish the professionalism that they have displayed had been applied in our CWG preparation, and several useful parallels can be drawn from their approach to the job.

Set your cost estimates early and realistically, and build in contingencies: For major programmes, like the Channel Tunnel and the Sydney Opera House, according to the BT Centre for Major Programme Management at Sa?d Business School, 9 out of 10 programmes have cost overruns and overruns of 50-100% are common. Overruns above 100% are not uncommon, assuming the budgeting has been done honestly. The lesson is extremely clear, and should not come as a surprise to anyone who has ever engaged in a large programme of public works: build in very large contingencies into your budgeting and planning process. There is no evidence that this was ever done in preparation for CWG, hence the constantly inflating cost estimates, and a final figure of over 10 times the initial proposed outlay.

Prepare and procure before the construction begins: For big projects, like the London 2012 Olympics, it makes sense to codify some of the procurement policies, as the Olympic Delivery Authority has done in the UK, in a 44-page ?Procurement Policy? available online. The main principles: ?The delivery of the venues and infrastructure (including transport), in a technically satisfactory and commercially viable state, to Programme, [and] to budget, while achieving Value for Money, and the achievement of the legacy [of the games].? For the CWG, the planning process was clearly inadequate, and the proliferation of multiple authorities with no clearly demarcated jurisdiction exacerbated the accountability vacuum that was filled by corrupt procurement practices. How was this allowed to happen?

Have a timeline, and stick to it: Construction takes longer than you think. The important thing here is to understand that cost overruns are often accompanied by time overruns. Indeed, the two are related for large projects: from a study of over 100 large transport projects, the BT Centre found that a one year increase in the ?implementation phase? of a project resulted in an increase in percentage cost overrun of 4.64 percentage points, not including financing costs.

Care about the end-product: The CWG has shown the world what a lot of Indians already know, that the concept of dignity of labour is virtually unknown in our country, especially when it comes to public works. Stories of collapsing bridges and roofs are terribly embarrassing. Dismissing criticisms as stemming from ?differences in standards? between India and the rest of the world is a strategy that is pathetic and absurd, not to mention irresponsible. We are more than capable of establishing standards that are the envy of the rest of the world. The ridiculousness of the attitude on display at CWG was brought home to me by the attitude of the workmen in our home renovation, who care about every last detail, pointing out flaws in the previous construction to us, and rectifying them along the way; meticulously working through and thinking about every small detail of the construction process; and discarding sub-standard materials rather than simply working with whatever we initially procured. I would have loved to see the same work ethic on display in the CWG preparation.

An embarrassment is an opportunity to do better but I?m pessimistic that we?ll see any such change in our country. Voluminous articles have been written on the disaster that is the run-up to the Games, and we?re justifiably the current whipping boys of the international media. Yet, the response thus far has been brazenness and a refusal to take responsibility. Public rage is by now all too common in India, and those responsible for the games fiasco know that in all probability, nothing will come of it?note that nothing palpable has changed since the dreadful incidents of 26/11.

It is imperative that we learn from this fiasco, as it has important ramifications for our capability to build infrastructure to effectively leverage the demographic dividend that is coming our way. After all, CWG was supposed to be an excuse (as is the case with all such games) to build Delhi?s infrastructure. Let?s learn these lessons, and try to turn things around in India even if nothing more can be done to salvage these Games.

The author is a financial economist at the Sa?d Business School, University of Oxford