On the night of March 16-17, 2026, an Israeli airstrike near Tehran killed Ali Ardashir Larijani, Iran’s Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). The strike also killed his son Morteza, and several bodyguards. Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz claimed responsibility, calling it “precise.”
Larijani, aged 67, had become Iran’s de facto leader after Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was assassinated in the early days of the US-Israel war on Iran.
In recent days, when Iran fully took control of the Strait of Hormuz and vowed to bomb any tanker that tried to pass through it, India managed to get three of its tankers home. How? India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar had relied heavily on Iran’s top officials as partners in protecting Indian interests, especially at Chabahar Port and along the Strait of Hormuz.
However, now, without him, the Iranian leadership is left in “pure survival mode,” where aggression has become the main tool of statecraft.
For India, the consequences could be twofold — diplomatic uncertainty in a region where backchannels once worked, and energy vulnerabilities affecting everyday life.
Larijani was the decision maker for Hormuz passage
Larijani was Iran’s top nuclear negotiator and secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, the decision-making body that controls Iran’s Hormuz posture. He was widely seen as a pragmatist within the regime, someone who had travelled to Oman in February to mediate indirect talks with Washington.
India’s diplomatic channel for safe passage through Hormuz ran through exactly this tier of Iranian decision-making. PM Modi spoke to President Pezeshkian, EAM Jaishankar held multiple calls with FM Araghchi — but the operational decision on which ships pass and which don’t sits with the SNSC. Larijani ran that body.
The rare exception Iran granted to two Indian LPG tankers to cross Hormuz was a product of this diplomatic engagement. With the man who oversaw that machinery now dead
At the moment, there are 22 Indian vessels in the strait. These include the six LPG ships, one LNG tanker, four crude oil carriers, one chemical and products vessel, three container ships, and two bulk carriers.
If Iran’s internal command structure is fragmented, even a goodwill agreement on Indian ship passage may not hold on the water.
LPG shortages may worsen, prices could rise, and the Modi government faces more pressure. On top of that, Iran’s Parliament Speaker has now declared that shipping through the Strait “will not return to pre-war norms,” making the passage risky.
Chabahar Port: India’s strategic lifeline at risk
India’s $1.68 billion investment in Chabahar Port, operated by Indian Ports Global Limited, is key to its “Look West” strategy, connecting India to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).
So far, it was seen as a neutral, safe zone. But reports of strikes near the Chabahar Free Trade Zone on March 16 show that this security is slipping. The IRGC is tightening its grip, making India’s previously protected position more vulnerable.
US jets reportedly hit military facilities near the Chabahar Free Trade-Industrial Zone. India’s parliamentary panel on external affairs warned of “uncertainty over Chabahar’s future.” The US sanctions waiver for Indian operations expires in April 2026. Trade worth over ₹15,000 crore is at risk.
Larijani’s assassination removes the most reliable interlocutor as Tehran focuses on survival, not partnerships.
Tehran mourns the death of Ali Larijani – Why his death could drag the war
State media called Larijani’s death “martyrdom,” President Pezeshkian warned of “severe revenge,” and the Revolutionary Guards have already intensified their attack. Internationally, the strike is seen as an attempt to decapitate Iran’s leadership.
India, by contrast, remains measured, following its policy of strategic autonomy and non-alignment. No official statement has been issued. Larijani’s death is more than a single loss. With Khamenei and now Larijani gone, Iran faces its gravest internal crisis in decades: possible succession struggles, declining IRGC morale, and unclear control over nuclear and Gulf policies.