More often than not, it is the misses that people remember more than the hits. The concept is the same in both business and sports, or the business of sports. When the Indian Premier League (IPL) was conceived after India’s T20 World Cup 2007 title win, 11 cities were set as options to select a total of 8, earmarked for becoming franchises that would be represented by a team each.
In the race to acquire a team, everybody who was ‘somebody’ in India lined up—from business conglomerates to HNIs, Bollywood superstars, and media giants as well. Naturally, Anil Ambani, chair of the Anil Dhirubhai Ambani Group (ADAG), also threw his hat in the ring, only he missed—not once, or twice, but eight times—to end up having no franchise in the inaugural edition of the IPL.
How did ADAG fail to land a franchise in 2008?
According to the original 2008 bid sheet shared by Lalit Modi on March 26 (Thursday), Anil Ambani’s Emerald Telecom (ADAG) was the most active bidder in the room, placing formal offers for 8 out of the 11 available slots.
They bid for Ahmedabad apart from the seven franchises that were eventually picked. The only franchise picked and not bid for by ADAG was Jaipur. Eventually, they lost every bid as they were too cautious in their strategy.
For example, while elder brother Mukesh Ambani, through his subsidiary Rathipriya Trading Ltd, focused on securing Mumbai with a top-tier bid of $111.9 million (approx. ₹447 crore), Anil attempted a “volume play” that ultimately left him on the sidelines of the world’s most lucrative cricket league.
The “High Volume, Low Value” Trap
Here’s how ADAG lost the race they tried to run cautiously:
In Mumbai, Anil bid $72.9 million (approx. ₹292 crore), losing to his own brother’s $111.9 million.
In Delhi, his company bid $66.9 million (approx. ₹268 crore), losing to GMR’s $84 million.
In Kolkata, their $62.9 million (approx. ₹252 crore) bid was dwarfed by Shah Rukh Khan and Jai Mehta’s $75 million.
Similar was the fate they met with even in Mohali, Chennai, and Hyderabad, where the competition was limited but the competitor knew what they were fighting for.
For Chennai and Hyderabad, the winning bids were by entities that did not bid for any other city franchise. India Cements ($91 million) acquired Chennai and Deccan Chronicle got Hyderabad ($107 million). Preity Zinta had the better of ADAG to get the Mohali franchise for $76 million.
Preity’s other bids were for Mumbai, Delhi, and Jaipur at nearly the same amount for which they got Mohali—again, a strategy that is copybook in the sports business.
ADAG’s biggest mistake: Not being aggressive
In the 2008 auction format, you only won if you were the highest bidder for that specific city slot. By trying to be “in the mix” for everything but the highest for nothing, ADAG walked out of the room with zero franchises.
Fast forward to March 2026, and the gravity of that miss is historic. While not delving into the details of the financial struggles ADAG faces at the moment, had they acquired even one team, the value it would have carried today—relative to a few crore more than his intended investment back then—is unimaginable.
The Lesson in Scarcity
The 2008 bid sheet is a stark reminder of the “Ballmer Effect” before it had a name. Those who “overpaid” in 2008—like the UB Group or Reliance—are today sitting on assets that have grown by over 3,500%. Meanwhile, the ADAG strategy of “safe bidding” serves as a cautionary tale in sports business: in a league with only 10 chairs (8 back then), the only thing more expensive than overpaying is not getting a seat at all.