By Anita Inder Singh
As many countries voice displeasure regarding the economically disruptive policies of President Donald Trump, they also search for new ways of cooperating with each other to confront them. Those challenging the US are middle powers and they comprise most of the world’s countries. However, can so many states, geographically non-contiguous and diverse, come together to form a unified force to serve as an effective counterweight to the US and China?
What is a middle power? It is a country that is not a superpower—thus, the range of middle powers across the world is very wide. Their economic strength, measured in terms of GDP and GDP per capita, can vary greatly. The GDPs per capita of small countries like Switzerland ($103, 998.2) and Singapore ($96,740 are higher than that of the US ($84,534), but they will never be superpowers
Middle powers push back as Trump upends alliances
Larger countries including India, Australia, Japan, South Africa, and Germany have a lower GDP per capita than the US and are all middle powers. However, as Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz told the German Parliament on January 29, it is time to think of Europeans as partners and not subordinates—which is how Trump is treating even the US’ closest allies.
So, when Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney compared faith in the “international rules-based order” at the 2026 World Economic Forum in Davos, he sought to shock most world leaders out of complacency and to confront the Trump-created crisis in that order.
Carney’s speech pointed to the widening rift between the US and its closest allies and partners. For him, this order—despite its hypocrisy and inconsistency—has proved essential for upholding collective security and global economic governance. Trump has weaponised interdependence, leaving even the US’s friends and allies vulnerable to his predatory, hegemonic ambitions.
Carney urged middle powers to abandon the idea of the US as the world’s protective, friendly sheriff and to “develop greaterstrategic autonomy”. This autonomy would be based on national self-reliance and issue-based coalitions in response to the world’s problems rather than on any ideological divide. Middle powers would unite to resist coercion by the superpower and defend their shared interests—it would be possible to think about an alliance of middle powers.
At the same time, middle-power strategic autonomy would hinge on the countries’ intentions rather than their power. Countries would be guided by their wishes and be needed to cooperate internationally and look beyond the apparent necessity of cooperating with the US and China. French President Emmanuel Macron, Singapore’s PM Lawrence Wong, and even the European Union’s (EU) proposed free trade agreements with Latin America and India, reflect such wishes.
The problem is that a small number of middle powers might be able to achieve such cooperation from time to time—but not all of them. Divisions regarding Ukraine and Gaza, for instance, establish this fact. Despite such differences, middle powers should uphold existing international rules and norms, whatever their inconsistencies.
Middle powers face many problems. The first is the US-China rivalry. Canada’s geographical distance from China might explain why Ottawa wishes to have stronger trading ties with Beijing, not least because 77% of its trade is with the neighbourhood bully US. But Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand might take a different view, as would the European Union. Their diverse interests would reduce the chances for collective middle-power bargaining. Each middle power would find its own way and engage in diplomatic hedging—implying a mix of cooperation and confrontation.
Rising powers’ Russia ties complicate Western outreach
At another level, the second concern is about developing countries, some of which—including India, Indonesia, and Vietnam—are perceived as rising powers. Each has strong ties with Russia. This points to the difficulties highly industrialised Western states have sometimes had in winning their support.
On another plane are rich middle powers willing to accept geoeconomic bargains to decrease their dependence on the US and China. After all, domestic wrangles over trade usually stem from related political and economic differences, not merely from the wishes of political leaders regarding the upholding of international norms.
Generally, Carney’s vision offers no suggestions for managing geopolitical competition. Short-term, ad hoc coalitions cannot craft or deliver international rules. International organisations based on universal membership will remain essential for resolving these dilemmas.
Recently, Canadian and British hopes of improving relations with China came up against the reality that it is the world’s biggest mercantilist power. It has a heavily subsidised dynamic industrial and export sector. Economic policies that restrict consumption and boost production add up to mercantilist behaviour that makes China unreliable at best, and even irresponsible. For the UK and Germany, China may be a more predictable trade partner than the US right now, but it is not, as Carney claimed, a more reliable partner. That is evident from the erection of trade barriers against cheap Chinese exports by more than 50 rich middle countries.
Moreover, does any democracy really want a Chinese totalitarian state—a security threat to its neighbours—to dominate a new world order?
As for India and the EU, one can only hope that what European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has hailed as “the world’s largest democracies, committed…to shape a new global order”, will be proven right and that any trade deal between India and Trump’s US will not upset their apple cart. That will indeed mark a success for two middle powers.
The author is Founding Professor, Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are the author’s own and do not reflect the official policy or position of Financial Express.