Since the early Cold War, America has seen India, with its size, economic resources, and strategic position in Asia as a counterpoise to communist China. Over the last two decades, the world’s two largest democracies have built up their strategic partnership and America is the largest single buyer of India’s exports. And it has long been the foreign country in which many Indians wish to study, work, or live.
The deterioration of US-India relations under the second Trump administration is, to a considerable extent, being viewed through the lens of the friction over trade and the shifting US positions on China and Pakistan in Washington’s national security strategy. Trump has presented China, the world’s second largest economic and military power but behind America, with the gift of equality.
At another level, Trump’s recent decision to do away with the term “Indo-Pacific”, which he himself started using in 2017, has dismayed Delhi, which thought it reflected India’s rising stature in Asia. This is probably why Prime Minister Narendra Modi referred to the importance of the Indo-Pacific during his recent official visits to Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand.
Alliances have characterised one of the most important aspects of US defence and foreign policies, so non-aligned India has never been a high priority for America. Because India is not a treaty ally, America has never given Delhi its most sophisticated matériel. That situation has existed since Indian independence in 1947.
Fissures in the Indo-US relationship were apparent even under a more India-friendly Joe Biden, whose abrupt decision to withdraw American forces from Afghanistan in August 2021 enabled the Pakistan-backed Taliban to return to power. This was followed two weeks later by the creation of AUKUS, between allies Australia, the United Kingdom, and the US as an exclusive trilateral pact focussing on sharing highly sensitive nuclear-submarine technology. Delhi responded cautiously to AUKUS. While perceiving AUKUS as countering Chinese expansion, it also feared that AUKUS could overtake India’s own position in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean.
On another plane, the Biden administration was also both wary of, and disappointed with, India’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which strained the relationship between them. Trump has realised that Delhi cannot or will not be a peacemaker in Ukraine, which is an additional reason why he shows little interest in India.
Pakistan’s mediation in the ongoing Gulf crisis has been helpful to Washington. In return, Washington has actively modernised Pakistan’s F-16s, making them more lethal against India, the country with which Islamabad is likely to fight a war. Over the past year, Washington and Islamabad have renewed strategic accommodation, driven in part by insecurity in West Asia. This is not in India’s interest because Pakistan, like its all-weather friend, China, claims part of north Indian territory. The outstanding fact is that Trump’s diplomatic move towards Pakistan has taken the veil off India’s claim to be the Vishwaguru.
America’s rivalry with China has never inspired Washington to treat India as an equal. Trump has only highlighted the inequality between them. It has taken India’s “strategic autonomists” long to realise that Washington does not see India as an equal partner.
Meanwhile, China, simultaneously a Pacific and South Asian country, claims Indian territory. It also offers stiff competition in Delhi’s crucially important immediate Indian Ocean neighbourhood and presents more economically and in terms of arms sales to all of India’s neighbours. Like Biden, Trump expects India to settle its border dispute with China bilaterally, while Delhi hopes that in the event of a strategic crunch, America will aid India.
India’s economic dependence on the US remains strong despite Trumpian tariffs. Indeed, unlike America, no European country buys 21% of its exports. The UK and Germany buy less than 3% each; as does Australia, a leading Pacific trading partner. A mere 3.3% of America’s imports come from India; 2.2% of US exports go to India. America’s trade deficit with India largely explains Trump’s economic threats and imposition of heavier tariffs on Indian goods. Ironically, the US remains economically more important to India rather than vice-versa. India may find it increasingly hard to live with this reality.
Soaring visions and ambitions of achieving global greatness are also reshaping the US-India relationship. In Washington, the emerging bipartisan consensus is unfavourable to India. This consensus reveals that for different reasons, Trump’s MAGA Congressmen and some American liberals share a dislike of India. MAGA-ist Congressmen believe that Indians have exploited the US immigration system to steal high-paying jobs from Americans.
On the other side of the political spectrum, American liberals perceive India as a problematic democratic partner because of Modi’s apparent curtailing of democratic institutions and religious freedom. For example, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom has repeatedly labelled India a “country of particular concern” on religious freedom. Delhi ripostes that this allegation is politically motivated and biased. Meanwhile, Christian conservatives often see the beliefs of Hindu-Americans as incompatible with Christian values. And it is notable that Secretary of State Marco Rubio, accompanied by US Ambassador Sergio Gor, began his Indian trip in May with a visit to Christian missionaries in Kolkata.
The cultural tensions in America and India are shaping political debates in both countries. Long-standing adherence to political and economic statecraft is being accompanied by religious and identity politics. As identity politics and boasts about their respective national greatness become more obvious in both countries, they could further strain Indo-US ties.
Unfortunately, the mix of identity politics, India’s dependence on America, and Trump’s perception of India as a weak country with a laggardly economy that has little to offer the US is not a happy augury for the Indo-US relationship in the foreseeable future.
The author is a Founding Professor at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are the author’s own and do not reflect the official policy or position of Financial Express.