Indian industry has long enjoyed a comfortable bargain with the state: seek protection when foreign competitors threaten, demand subsidies when investment becomes expensive, lobby for concessions when profits come under pressure, and claim credit for national development when the government obliges. Too rarely is evidence demanded that these privileges have produced internationally competitive businesses. This arrangement must end. Public policy cannot remain an insurance scheme against competition.

Companies seeking tariff protection, production incentives, concessional land or preferential procurement must show what taxpayers get in return: higher productivity, technological capability, domestic value addition, and export competitiveness. Those that deliver should receive support. Those that consistently fail should lose it. India has spent too long debating how much protection industry deserves and too little asking if it has earned it.

The criticism increasingly comes from within the establishment. Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal has repeatedly questioned industry’s dependence on subsidies, high import duties, and protectionism. He has warned that India’s enormous domestic market lets businesses earn comfortable profits without pursuing global opportunities. Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman has questioned the continued dependence on imports for goods domestic industry should be able to produce, while acknowledging the need to import critical machinery and inputs. The contradiction is hard to ignore: companies demand protection against imports while remaining dependent on imported technology, components, and equipment.

Another telling measure of complacency is this: why has an economy of India’s size produced so few globally recognised consumer brands? Banker Uday Kotak has asked why India cannot name a consumer brand recognised from Boston to Bolivia and China. He attributes this partly to the comfort of a protected market of 1.4 billion people. Why take the risks needed to win global customers when attractive profits can be earned at home?

India has internationally successful firms in information technology and pharmaceuticals, and several strong domestic consumer brands. But it has few equivalents of Japan’s Toyota and Sony, South Korea’s Samsung and Hyundai, or China’s increasingly visible brands. Building such brands requires sustained investment in design, research, quality, distribution, and customer trust. Domestic commercial success and international competitiveness are not the same thing.

Solar manufacturing illustrates the wider problem. Import duties, approved manufacturer lists, and production-linked incentives have helped create substantial module-making capacity. Yet expansion has concentrated in the final stages of production. A NITI Aayog assessment estimated import dependence at nearly 100% for polysilicon, more than 90% for wafers, and over 60% for cells. Rapid growth in module capacity has also raised fears of oversupply, prompting the renewable energy ministry to caution lenders against indiscriminate financing of standalone facilities.

This does not mean solar incentives have achieved nothing: capacity has expanded, and some producers are integrating further. But protection can encourage investment in relatively accessible activities without creating technological depth across the value chain. Building factories is easier than building competitive industrial capabilities.

This matters beyond solar. India’s industrial ambitions cannot be fulfilled by substituting domestic assembly for imports while depending on foreign suppliers for the most valuable components. Nor is every import a sign of failure, since efficient manufacturers everywhere participate in global supply chains. The real question is whether Indian companies are steadily improving their technological capabilities, their productivity, and their ability to compete without permanent assistance. Domestic firms legitimately face cheap imports, foreign subsidies, expensive infrastructure, and costly finance. But these difficulties cannot become permanent excuses for avoiding investment in research, technology, skills, and scale. An industry that has enjoyed years of assistance should show what it has accomplished. Otherwise, protection preserves business models rather than transforming them.

Several East Asian economies took a different approach. South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan did not rely solely on free markets. Their governments supported selected industries, directed finance, facilitated technology acquisition, and invested in infrastructure and skills. But their strategies imposed a discipline that India’s has often lacked. South Korean industrial groups received preferential credit and protection, yet export performance became the crucial test of progress. Taiwan paired public research institutions with an outward-looking manufacturing strategy.

Japan’s transformation involved technological upgrading and competitive pressure. These models also produced waste, favouritism, and corporate concentration. Yet their central lesson holds: assistance was meant to help businesses become competitive enough to eventually do without it. Protection was a bridge to global markets, not a permanent wall around domestic profits.

India should apply that principle systematically. Every significant industrial incentive should carry explicit performance obligations. Beneficiaries of tariff protection, production-linked subsidies, concessional finance, or procurement preferences should commit to measurable gains in productivity, exports, research spending, local sourcing, and workforce skills. Targets must reflect industry circumstances, but there must be milestones, deadlines, and consequences. Support should decline when commitments are repeatedly missed, and programmes need credible sunset provisions.

The government should publish the value of assistance and the outcomes achieved. Announcing investments and celebrating factory inaugurations is not enough. How much technology has been absorbed? How many competitive suppliers have emerged? What share of output can be sold abroad without subsidies? These questions should decide whether support continues.

The Economic Survey 2025-26 reinforced this argument. It criticised companies for relying on regulatory arbitrage and political mediation instead of investing in long-term competitiveness, research, and frontier manufacturing. Its description of manufacturing and exports as institutional stress tests is particularly apt. Industry associations, too, should be judged by the capabilities they help create, not the concessions they secure. Common research facilities, technical training, testing infrastructure, and supplier development would serve their members better than perpetual lobbying for protection.

None of this absolves the government. It cannot demand competitiveness while imposing high logistics costs, unpredictable regulation, expensive finance, and inadequate infrastructure. Nor can it expect frontier innovation without strengthening varsities, laboratories, and technical education. The bargain must run both ways. The government provides predictable policies, efficient services, and time-bound assistance, and businesses deliver productivity, innovation, and competitive products. Performance conditions must be independently verified, not turned into another instrument of bureaucratic discretion.

India cannot become a manufacturing power by shielding companies from the competition that would force them to improve. A large domestic market is an advantage, not an entitlement to captive customers. Genuine self-reliance comes from technological competence, productive capacity, and products that consumers worldwide willingly buy. The bargain should be unmistakable: compete, improve, and export—or stop expecting taxpayers to underwrite your business model.