Every major conflict in West Asia eventually produces the same debate back home: which side should India support? The latest escalation involving Iran, Israel, and the United States has revived that familiar argument. Critics in sections of the opposition and parts of the left-leaning academic establishment have suggested that India should tilt more openly towards Iran, partly on the grounds of historical ties and partly as a counterweight to Western influence. Others maintain that our expanding defence and technology partnerships require us to stand more firmly with the US and Israel.
Both arguments reflect a way of thinking that belongs largely to the twentieth century. Much of the intellectual framework shaping this debate comes from an era when global politics was organised around rigid ideological camps. In that world, countries were expected to belong clearly to one bloc or another. But the strategic environment in which we operate today is far more fluid. In a system defined by overlapping interests rather than ideological camps, rigid positioning rarely serves national interest.
The current war illustrates precisely why. India is not a direct participant in the conflict and is unlikely to become one. Its interests in the region are primarily economic, energy-related, and geopolitical. Millions of Indian citizens live and work across West Asia. A large share of India’s energy imports continues to flow from the region. Maritime routes through the Arabian Sea and the Gulf remain critical to trade. For New Delhi, the overriding objective in any regional crisis is therefore stability rather than alignment.
Seen through that lens, the argument for maintaining strategic equidistance becomes clearer. India cannot afford to alienate Iran entirely. Tehran remains an important regional actor and geography alone ensures that it will continue to feature in India’s strategic calculations. Projects such as the Chabahar port and connectivity corridors into Central Asia have long been seen as part of India’s effort to bypass Pakistan and expand continental access.
But the assumption that Iran is automatically aligned with India’s interests has never been entirely accurate. The history of the relationship offers several reminders. Iran has at times supported Pakistan-backed positions on Kashmir or publicly criticised India’s policies there, even while maintaining diplomatic ties. On other occasions, India itself has taken positions that displeased Tehran. During the negotiations over the India-US civil nuclear agreement, for instance, New Delhi voted against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency on multiple occasions over its nuclear programme.
Myth of Automatic Alignment
The same realism applies to India’s relations with the US. The strategic partnership between the two countries has deepened considerably over the past two decades, spanning defence cooperation, technology, and trade. Yet Washington has never hesitated to pursue its own interests when they diverge from India’s.
Recent trade tensions illustrate this clearly. The US imposed tariffs on a wide range of Indian exports during a dispute over trade and energy policy, at one point raising duties sharply and linking them to India’s purchase of Russian oil.
India itself has followed this pragmatic approach in earlier crises. When the US invaded Iraq in 2003, New Delhi resisted pressure to send troops despite improving ties with Washington. Two decades later, during the Russia-Ukraine war, India again avoided taking sides, maintaining defence and energy ties with Moscow while expanding cooperation with the US and Europe.
Strategic Autonomy
This is why framing the current West Asian conflict as a choice between camps misses the larger point. India’s relationships with Iran, Israel, and the US each serve different strategic purposes. Iran provides geographic access to Central Asia and remains an important regional player. Israel is a major defence and technology partner. The US is central to India’s long-term strategic and economic ambitions.
Abandoning or visibly downgrading any one of these relationships during a regional conflict would therefore narrow India’s options without producing clear benefits. Strategic equidistance, by contrast, preserves flexibility.
This approach is sometimes criticised as ambiguity. In reality, it reflects a recognition that the international system no longer functions through rigid alliances alone. Even countries with formal treaty alliances routinely maintain working relations with their adversaries when it serves their interests.
India’s posture towards the current conflict reflects the same logic. It does not require rhetorical alignment with any side. What it requires is the preservation of strategic autonomy in a region where alignments can shift quickly and where the costs of escalation could spread far beyond the battlefield.
History offers a useful reminder here. Conflicts that begin as regional crises often acquire labels that place them within larger geopolitical narratives. The twentieth century gave us the First and Second World Wars, the Cold War, and the Gulf War. Each term captured a particular moment in the evolution of international politics.
As the war in West Asia continues, those old labels are beginning to echo again. Some observers speak of the possibility of a third Gulf War. Others see the contours of a new Cold War. Still others warn of the dangers of a wider global conflict. Whether the present moment eventually comes to be described as World War III, Cold War II or Gulf War III, the logic of national interest will remain the same.