The India-US bilateral trade agreement may have reached what Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman calls a “plateau”, but that need not be viewed as a failure. India has already demonstrated willingness to address US concerns. The interim framework announced in February envisaged the US lowering its reciprocal tariff on Indian goods to 18%, while India offered substantial tariff reductions and market access for American products. Washington continues to seek concessions in sensitive areas, while its own tariff policy remains vulnerable to legal and political shifts. New Delhi should remain open to an agreement, but not pursue one simply for the sake of concluding it. Reciprocity, not the optics of a deal, must determine how far India goes. The point of negotiation is mutual benefit, not an agreement in which one side repeatedly retreats.
That principle is particularly important in agriculture and other sensitive sectors. Indian negotiators have resisted opening the market to genetically modified maize and soya bean and to dairy products on terms sought by Washington. They should continue to protect legitimate domestic interests. India, for its part, has sought tariff treatment that leaves its exporters competitive with countries such as Vietnam and Bangladesh. A trade agreement in which India opens more of its market while its exporters remain structurally disadvantaged in the US would be difficult to justify. Washington has also launched investigations under Section 301 in areas including excess capacity and forced labour, adding another layer of uncertainty. Trade negotiations inevitably involve give-and-take, but concessions must be matched by durable and commercially meaningful gains.
The case for holding the line has become stronger with the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. The law gives the US president authority to impose tariffs of up to 100% on goods from countries that meet specified criteria relating to purchases of Russian-origin crude oil or natural gas. For India, energy sourcing cannot simply be treated as a bargaining chip in a trade negotiation. Access to competitively priced crude has consequences for inflation, the current account, the rupee, and household purchasing power. Sitharaman is right to warn about the weaponisation of tariffs. A trading partner is entitled to negotiate for market access; it is another matter to use access to its market to influence a sovereign country’s energy choices. India should diversify its crude supplies where economically sensible, but decisions of this magnitude must ultimately be determined by its own energy security and national interest.
None of this argues for turning away from the US. It remains one of India’s most important economic partners, a major market for Indian exports, and an important source of investment and technology. A balanced bilateral trade agreement would benefit both countries and negotiations should continue. But India also brings assets to the table: a large consumer market, a growing manufacturing base, and an increasingly important role in global supply chains. These confer bargaining power that should not be surrendered in pursuit of an early announcement. Nor should disagreements over trade be allowed to overwhelm the broader strategic relationship. The correct approach is therefore neither confrontation nor capitulation. India has moved substantially; if Washington cannot offer reciprocal, predictable, and durable market access, New Delhi can afford to wait. A good agreement remains worth pursuing. An unbalanced one does not. In trade negotiations, knowing where to stop can be as important as knowing where to compromise.
