A quest for security in West Asia

The failure of President Trump’s superpower America to defeat a regional power like Iran, or to influence its ally, Israel, to stop its genocidal war in Gaza, largely explain why Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan fear an unstable West Asia. This is the main reason why they signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement (MJDA) on August 7 after nearly a year of negotiations.

Wars have been fought in West Asia for nearly three years since the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023. Israel has waged war in Gaza, invaded southern Lebanon, seized territory in Syria, and launched two air campaigns against Iran. Tehran has retaliated by turning its guns on countries having US bases, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Jordan, and Israel.

Although all three “Mecca countries” have Muslim majorities comprising more than 95% of their populations — and Sunni majorities — they have not entered into any kind of “religious” alliance against Christian-majority America, Shiite Iran, or Jewish-majority Israel. Turkey is a NATO ally, its military is the second largest, just after the US — and most of its arms come from Germany. Saudi Arabia is home to Islam’s outstanding shrines and one of the world’s top oil exporters. Pakistan is the only nuclear-armed member of the MJDA.

The MJDA states that an armed attack on one signatory would count as an attack on all, but it mentions no commitments or defence obligations, unlike NATO’s Article 5. It cannot be an alliance because the three members lack integrated military planning, intelligence and defence industrial cooperation, and joint missile and air defences.

The MJDA is not primarily directed against Tehran, although Iran has bombed US bases in Saudi Arabia and some other West Asian countries. All three signatories are wary of Iranian power, but they also have reasons to prevent Iran’s destruction or permanent isolation because that could empower Israel to dominate West Asia. Iran is actually the main counterpoise to Israel in the region. If it were defeated by the US and Israel, instability across the Gulf and Central and South Asia could prevail.

Nor is the MJDA anti-American, although Washington initially joined forces with Israel against Iran.

Saudi Arabia is an American ally; Turkey is member of NATO and has the second-largest military in the alliance, while Pakistan, an old ally, has made its diplomacy useful to the US in West Asia.

Essentially, the three Mecca countries wish to develop their individual capabilities so that they increase their clout to avert disastrous consequences of Israeli and American military actions.

In reality, they do not trust Washington either to restrain Israel or to prevent American power from being used by Israel in ways that destabilise their neighbourhood.

The signing of the MJDA follows nearly a year of negotiations, which followed America’s initial strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities in 2025, soon after Trump 2.0 was inaugurated. Trump has steadily expanded America’s use of military force against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Since the US and Israel attacked Iran on February 28 this year, Iran has struck back by firing on Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states having American bases, and by blockading their energy shipments.

The two noteworthy facts are that all three Mecca states have amicable ties with America, and good relationships with each other. Turkey is Pakistan’s second-largest supplier of matériel — the largest is China.

China has invested economically in all three countries, and is the top trading partner of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The Saudi kingdom and Pakistan are on China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI). Turkey’s Europe-Central Asia-China “Middle Corridor” is linked to the BRI. However, the Mecca statement did not specify the commitments each had accepted and how far their agreement would bind them to any particular military action in each other’s defence.

Saudi Arabia envisages the trilateral framework strengthening the three countries’ collective diplomatic and defence weight, while contributing to the emergence of a more regionally driven security architecture. It has clarified that the accord does not represent an effort to establish a military axis or a sectarian bloc, nuclear ambitions, or an arms race.

Pakistan’s mutual defence pact with Saudi Arabia last year marked the first major defence deal between an Arab state and a country with n-weapons. However, it has not responded to Iran’s military attacks on the kingdom earlier this year. Islamabad has also discounted suggestions that its nuclear deterrent might be extended to allies. Pakistan has provided training, technical assistance, and an air defence system to Saudi forces and stationed some 8,000 troops in the country.

Meanwhile, Turkey and Pakistan have exchanged warships and training aircraft. Both Pakistan and Turkey have also voiced support for a maritime defence coalition. And, as one of the world’s largest oil exporters, Saudi Arabia wants to protect regional shipping and energy routes.

Although India has refused to censure the US-Israeli  invasion of Iran, while tending to criticise Iran for instability in the Strait of Hormuz and rising oil prices, it should try not to be seen as an enemy of Iran and accept the Israeli president’s claim that India and Israel are allies. That would hardly reflect India’s strategic autonomy. And because Pakistan and India are rivals in South Asia, a pro-Israel Indian stance could add weight to any efforts by Islamabad to persuade Saudi Arabia and Turkey to take a more anti-India line. Both countries have good ties with India, and Saudi Arabia also has a large Indian diaspora.

This could be more important than India realises, as peace continues to elude West Asia and Iran’s survival seems certain, despite a long-drawn-out war with America and Israel.