The Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2026, is a welcome attempt to bring greater independence, professionalism, and transparency to an institutional system repeatedly subjected to litigation and judicial intervention. Successive governments have struggled to devise an appointments framework that satisfies the Supreme Court’s insistence that tribunals exercising powers earlier vested in high courts must possess comparable independence.
The Bill appears to have learnt from that history. Most importantly, it proposes a National Tribunals Commission with judicial pre-eminence, reduces the role of administrative ministries in appointments, and creates permanent machinery for selecting members. The Commission would have a retired Supreme Court judge or high court Chief Justice as chairperson, two retired high court judges, and two technical members, giving the judicial side a three-to-two majority. Search-cum-selection committees would also be judicially chaired, with the chair enjoying a casting vote.
An especially sensible provision requires the selection committee to recommend one name for each vacancy instead of offering the government a panel from which to choose. If a judicially dominated committee shortlists several candidates but the executive ultimately selects one, much of the purpose of insulating appointments is lost. A single-name recommendation leaves the substantive choice with the selection body.
The Bill also provides five-year terms for chairpersons and members, subject to age limits of 70 and 67 years respectively, without reviving the minimum age of 50 previously struck down. Equally important is the attempt to distance tribunals administratively from ministries that frequently appear before them as litigants. Requirements for funds, personnel, and infrastructure would be assessed through the Commission, although the government would continue to provide funding. Disciplinary oversight, too, would largely move away from direct executive control.
The more consequential reform may lie in the machinery beneath the Commission. Tribunal appointments have often suffered from episodic searches, uneven assessment, and excessive reliance on candidates’ reputations. The Bill envisages a permanent secretariat to track vacancies, advertise positions, process applications, and scrutinise eligibility, excluding the administrative ministry from this exercise.
Empanelled experts would assess candidates’ judgments, orders, or argued cases against predetermined parameters, while integrity checks would proceed separately. The selection committee would thus receive a consolidated dossier instead of relying predominantly on interviews and informal knowledge. The principle is sound: Merit should be demonstrated, not merely asserted. Qualifications, evaluation parameters, weightages, conflict-of-interest rules, and procedures would be settled in advance, making selections more consistent and leaving an auditable record.
There are nevertheless reasons to reserve judgement until the framework becomes operational. Institutional independence depends not merely on statutory design but also on prompt appointments, anticipation of vacancies, and adequate resources. The government would still prescribe principles through rules, provide funds, and issue appointment orders. The Commission and secretariat will therefore require sufficient capacity and genuine operational autonomy.
Even so, the proposed division of responsibilities is promising: The government lays down principles, the judicially dominated Commission frames regulations and exercises oversight, and the secretariat implements the process. The larger possibility raised by this model is equally interesting. A permanent secretariat, objective evaluation of a candidate’s work, declared criteria, institutional memory, and recorded reasons address several criticisms of the collegium system without necessarily disturbing judicial primacy. It would be premature to transplant this model wholesale to judicial appointments. But if it shows that independence can coexist with transparent procedures, professional evaluation, and accountability, tribunal reform could eventually offer lessons extending well beyond tribunals.