Why Ashish Dhawan and Sunil Singhania are betting big on 2 ignored healthcare stocks

The first belongs to Ashish Dhawan, the founder of private equity firm ChrysCapital and co-founder of Ashoka University. Per the exchange filings for the quarter ending June 2026, he raised his stake in a financial services company from 4.12% to 5.24%. The second belongs to Sunil Singhania, the founder of Abakkus Asset Manager. His Abakkus Diversified Alpha Fund re-entered a Healthcare company with a 2.07% stake, after dropping off the disclosed shareholder list for two straight quarters.

Both stocks have been unloved. Dhawan’s pick carries the baggage of a messy past. Singhania’s Healthcare re-entry has fallen around 27% over one year. And in both cases, a large corporate action followed within weeks. That makes these filings worth a closer read. Let us dive in.

#1 Religare Enterprises: Why Dhawan is Doubling Down on a Rebranded Lender

Religare Enterprises is a name older market watchers remember for all the wrong reasons. Promoter fraud, litigation, a lending book that nearly sank, and years of losses. Today it is a very different entity: a holding company for Care Health Insurance, in which it owns around 63%, plus Religare Finvest, an SME lender, a housing finance arm, and Religare Broking.

Dhawan has been invested in the company for a while now. Public filings show he held around 2.3% through 2023 and 2024, raised that to 4.08% by March 2025, and then added roughly 37 lakh shares in the June 2026 quarter to reach 5.24%. The holding is currently worth Rs 457 cr.

The timing is the interesting part. On 12th May 2026, along with its FY26 results, the board approved a demerger separating the lending, broking and allied operations from the health insurance business. Dhawan’s buying falls squarely in the quarter that plan was unveiled.

The ownership map has been redrawn too. The Burman family of Dabur came in as promoters with 25.67% in March 2025 after their open offer, rising to 30.27% by March 2026, helped by warrant conversions that brought in Rs 375 cr of fresh capital. Public shareholding, 83.92% at its March 2024 peak, was down to 50.49% by June 2026. The free float is shrinking while Dhawan adds.

Shrinking Free Float and the Burman Family Factor

The numbers show scale without, as yet, much profit. Consolidated revenue has more than tripled in five years, driven by Care Health, which contributes over 85% of the top line. FY26 revenue came in around Rs 8,461 cr, up about 15% over FY25. Profit went the other way, falling to Rs 73 cr from Rs 183 cr, as commission costs in the insurance business grew faster than premiums.

Financial Year	FY21	FY22	FY23	FY24	FY25	FY26	5Y CAGR
Sales (Rs cr)	2,513	3,227	4,679	6,266	7,385	8,461	28%
EBITDA (Rs cr)	278	-364	483	368	356	136	Drop
Net Profit (Rs cr)	-478	-1,539	3,169	347	183	73	Turnaround and Drop

Before being impressed, one must know that FY23 profit of Rs 3,169 cr was not earned by the business. It came from other income of Rs 3,473 cr booked that year, largely tied to the resolution of the old lending book.

And since FY21 was a loss year, a five-year profit CAGR does not hold much meaning. I have added the EBITDA row, but it must be noted that for an insurance led holding company, operating profit swings wildly with premium accounting, moving from a loss of Rs 364 cr in FY22 to a profit of Rs 483 cr in FY23. A growth rate on that would mislead more than it informs.

The Core Truth Behind Religare’s Wild Operating Profit Swings

Care Health grew gross written premium 24% to Rs 11,417 cr in FY26. Religare Finvest, the lender that once damaged the group, posted a profit of Rs 139 cr for the year, with net NPAs at a stable 0.8% and collection efficiency near 98%. Overall, group borrowings have collapsed from Rs 4,940 cr in FY21 to Rs 233 cr in FY25. The debt problem, in short, is gone.

The share price of Religare Enterprises was around Rs 165 in July 2021 and as of closing on 27^th July 2026 it was Rs 255.

About valuations, the company’s stock is currently trading at a PE of 99x compared to the current industry median of 31x. The 10-year median PE for the company is 73x while the industry median for the same period is 19x.

The market is clearly not valuing this company on reported profit. It is valuing the embedded worth of Care Health and the lending franchise, which the demerger is designed to unlock. That is the bet Dhawan appears to be making.

The risks are equally clear. The insurance segment posted a loss of Rs 46.8 cr at the pre-tax level in FY26. New accounting norms that spread multi-year premiums over the policy term nearly erased Care Health’s own profit, which fell to Rs 18 cr from Rs 208 cr. The company pays no dividend. And demergers need court and regulatory approvals, which take time and can stumble.

#2 TTK Healthcare: Sunil Singhania’s Bet on a Cash-Rich Fortress

TTK Healthcare is more of a sleepy story rather than a turnaround. The company belongs to the TTK group, the same family that runs TTK Prestige . Its portfolio is a curious mix. Woodward’s Gripe Water, sold in India since 1928. Skore, one of the country’s larger contraceptive brands. The TTK Chitra artificial heart valve. Fryums in foods. And until last week, the EVA and Good Home brands.

The company’s current market cap is Rs 1,537 cr and Singhania’s fund first showed up on the shareholder list with 1.13% in September 2023 and held that position, almost unchanged, for nine quarters through September 2025. Then it vanished from the list for two quarters, meaning the holding fell at least below the 1% disclosure line, if not to zero. The June 2026 filing shows it back at 2.07%, nearly double the old position. The fresh stake is currently worth Rs 32 cr.

The Rs 256 Crore Catalyst: Wipro’s Brand Acquisition

On 23rd July 2026, weeks after the quarter closed, TTK Healthcare announced the sale of its EVA and Good Home brands to Wipro Enterprises for Rs 256 cr plus GST. The two brands earned Rs 148 cr of revenue in FY26, about 17% of the company’s turnover, so the price works out to roughly 1.7 times their sales.

The deal is expected to close by 30th September 2026. For context, Rs 256 cr of cash is nearly 17% of the company’s entire market value of around Rs 1,537 cr. The stock has moved up from its June lows since.

Stripping the Illusions: A Core Operating Margin of Just 3%

Here is where honest reading matters. The operating business earns very little. The balance sheet, though, is a fortress.

Financial Year	FY21	FY22	FY23	FY24	FY25	FY26	5Y CAGR
Sales (Rs cr)	476	599	725	753	801	857	12%
EBITDA (Rs cr)	19	22	31	37	35	26	6%
Net Profit (Rs cr)	46	42	640	63	82	66	7%

EBITDA here refers to operating profit before other income. Read the CAGRs with care. The 12% sales growth is real, but it starts from a Covid-hit FY21 base. The FY23 profit of Rs 640 cr came almost entirely from a one-time other income of Rs 643 cr. And in FY26, other income of Rs 68 cr was more than double the operating profit of Rs 26 cr. Strip that out, and the core business earned an operating margin of just 3%.

Valuation Reality Check: Navigating the Historical P/E Divide

The share price of TTK Healthcare was around Rs 785 in July 2021 and as of closing on 27^th July 2026 it was Rs 1,089.

Book value stands at Rs 789 per share, so the stock trades at around 1.3 times book, and a little over 21 times FY26 earnings. The share is currently trading at a PE of 22x which is the same as the current industry median. The 10-year median PE for the company is 33x while the industry median for the same period is 16x.

Value Unlocking vs. Revenue Replacement Risks

A company valued at around Rs 1,537 cr, with a net worth of over Rs 1,100 cr, Rs 256 cr of fresh cash on the way, and brands like Woodward’s, Skore and the Chitra heart valve thrown in. This looks less like a growth bet and more like a value unlocking bet, where asset sales force the market to notice what the balance sheet already holds.

The risks deserve equal attention. The company loses 17% of its revenue once the brand sale closes, and it has not yet said what replaces it. Operating margins are thin and slipped in FY26. Working capital days have jumped from 49 to 161 in FY26. Return on equity has averaged a modest 6.55% over three years. And promoters, already at the 74.57% regulatory ceiling, cannot signal confidence by buying more.

Positioning Before the Corporate Action Hits

Neither Dhawan nor Singhania bought a market darling. They bought complicated, ignored companies where the value sits below the surface, in an insurance subsidiary in one case and in a cash-heavy balance sheet in the other. In both cases, corporate action that could surface that value arrived within weeks of the purchase.

None of this guarantees anything. Demergers stall. Deals fall through. Cheap stocks can stay cheap for years. But the June 2026 quarter has handed retail investors two live case studies in positioning before events, not after. The coming quarters, with the Religare demerger scheme and the Wipro deal closing on 30th September, will show whether the timing was as sharp as it now looks.

A smart way to be in the know would be to add these stocks to a watchlist and keep a vigilant eye on them.

Disclaimer:

Note: We have relied on data from http://www.Screener.in and http://www.trendlyne.com throughout this article. Only in cases where the data was not available, have we used an alternate, but widely used and accepted source of information.

The purpose of this article is only to share interesting charts, data points and thought-provoking opinions. It is NOT a recommendation. If you wish to consider an investment, you are strongly advised to consult your advisor. This article is strictly for educative purposes only.

Suhel Khan has been a passionate follower of the markets for over a decade. During this period, he was an integral part of a leading Equity Research organisation based in Mumbai as the Head of Sales & Marketing. Presently, he is spending most of his time dissecting the investments and strategies of the Super Investors of India.

Disclosure: The writer and his dependents do not hold the stocks discussed in this article. The website managers, its employee(s), and contributors/writers/authors of articles have or may have an outstanding buy or sell position or holding in the securities, options on securities or other related investments of issuers and/or companies discussed therein.