Vallabh Bhanshali’s 4-stock Rs 190 Cr portfolio: Value hidden in plain sight?

Per the exchange filings for the quarter ending June 2026, he discloses holdings above the 1% mark in just four companies, worth close to Rs 190 cr. A small book by super investor standards. Three of the four sit at almost exactly the same weight.

What makes the book interesting is not its size. It is that one of these companies holds a stake in another listed firm worth more than its own market value, and Bhanshali walked into it through a single trade in May. Let us dive in.

#1 Sunflag Iron & Steel: The Zero-Cost Steel Maker Hiding a ₹7,700Cr Mining Goldmine

Incorporated in 1984, Sunflag Iron & Steel makes alloy and special steels at Bhandara in Maharashtra along with spring steels, bearing steels, engine valve steels, forging grades etc. Its customers make gearboxes, axles and engine parts. Boring, cyclical, and until recently ignored.

Then in the first week of May 2026, it hit an all-time high after BSE bulk deal data showed Bhanshali picking up 20 lakh shares at an average of Rs 300 apiece, a cheque of Rs 60 cr. Over two sessions the stock climbed 29%.

That single trade is his entire position. At Rs 346 on 28^th August 2026, those shares are worth about Rs 70 cr, up roughly 16% in under four months.

The share is trading at a PE of 29x and the industry median is 21x. The 10-year median PE for the company is 12x while the industry median for the same period is 20x.

The Holding Company Discount: Why Sunflag’s “Terrible” Ratios Are a Mirage

Here is the part most people miss. In March 2023 Sunflag converted 6 crore zero coupon debentures it held in Lloyds Metals and Energy into 6 crore equity shares, handing it an 11.9% stake. Lloyds has since become one of the biggest stories in Indian mining.

Look at what that did to the books. Investments went from Rs 17 cr in FY22 to Rs 7,692 cr by March 2026, and reserves from Rs 1,569 cr to Rs 8,692 cr. Almost none of it came from making steel.

The market value of those investments is put at Rs 7,724 cr. Sunflag’s own market capitalisation on 27^th August 2026 was about Rs 6,291 cr. Subtract one from the other and the steel business, which did Rs 3,939 cr of sales and Rs 477 cr of operating profit in FY26, comes free with Rs 1,433 cr of change.

This is the classic holding company discount, and it is why the headline ratios look terrible. Return on equity reads 2.36%, but that is profit measured against an equity base inflated by a shareholding the steel plant never earned. The stock trades at 0.71 times book for the same reason.

The Operating Turnaround: Core Steel Profits Hit a 5-Year Peak

Financial Year	FY21	FY22	FY23	FY24	FY25	FY26	5Y CAGR
Sales (Rs cr)	1,892	2,698	3,488	3,415	3,536	3,939	16%
EBITDA (Rs cr)	254	398	446	375	389	477	13%
Net Profit (Rs cr)	141	217	1,115	144	162	202	8%

EBITDA refers to operating profit before other income. Ignore the FY23 profit of Rs 1,115 cr. It came from Rs 1,201 cr of other income on the Lloyds conversion, not from steel.

The operating business is finally turning. FY26 operating profit of Rs 477 cr was a five year high, borrowings fell from Rs 727 cr in FY24 to Rs 524 cr, and cash from operations doubled to Rs 390 cr. The June 2026 quarter delivered Rs 1,079 cr of sales and Rs 66 cr of profit.

On 14^th May 2026 it was declared successful bidder for the Tambia South coal block in Madhya Pradesh, under the twelfth tranche of commercial mining auctions. That is raw material security for a business that buys a lot of coal. It is also years from producing anything.

The risks are real. Return on capital employed has fallen to 4% from 16% in FY22. The super alloys plant built for aerospace and defence has cleared customer approvals but volumes remain slow. And a holding company discount can stay a discount for years.

#2 Greenlam Industries: The Capex Victim Punished by ₹238Cr

Incorporated in 2013 as a demerger from Greenply, Greenlam Industries makes decorative laminates, veneers, engineered wood flooring, doors and plywood. It is India’s largest laminate exporter.

This is Bhanshali’s largest position. He holds 29.41 lakh shares, about 1.2% of the company, worth roughly Rs 73 cr. That stake has not changed for nine straight quarters going back to June 2024.

The price of Greenlam Industries has compounded at 12% in the last 5 years and 13% in the last 10 years.

Behind the 69x PE: When a Profit Drought Masks 13% Operating Growth

Let us look at the 5-year financials for Greenlam Industries.

Financial Year	FY21	FY22	FY23	FY24	FY25	FY26	5Y CAGR
Sales (Rs cr)	1,200	1,703	2,026	2,306	2,569	3,046	21%
EBITDA (Rs cr)	174	188	233	296	275	325	13%
Net Profit (Rs cr)	74	91	129	138	68	56	-5%

EBITDA refers to operating profit before other income. Sales have more than doubled in five years. Net profit is lower today than in FY21. Not an operating problem, since EBITDA still grew 13% a year. A capital cost problem.

Greenlam spent heavily on new plants at Naidupeta and Tindivanam. Borrowings went from Rs 307 cr in FY21 to Rs 1,160 cr. Interest cost rose from Rs 17 cr to Rs 96 cr a year and depreciation from Rs 56 cr to Rs 142 cr. Those two lines now eat Rs 238 cr a year, up from Rs 73 cr. That is the entire missing profit, and return on capital employed has fallen from 15% to 8%.

The Free Cash Flow Pivot: Has the Bleeding Finally Stopped?

Free cash flow turned positive at Rs 204 cr in FY26 after two brutal years of minus Rs 440 cr and minus Rs 56 cr, and cash from operations hit a record Rs 292 cr. The June quarter brought in Rs 797 cr of sales and Rs 21 cr of profit.

Valuation is where it gets uncomfortable. The stock trades at a PE of about 69x, high because earnings are depressed rather than because the price ran away. On the FY24 profit of Rs 138 cr the same market value would be roughly 46 times. Either way, the market is already paying for a recovery that has not arrived.

Also worth flagging: domestic institutional holding fell from 15.73% in March 2025 to 10.89% in June 2026, while promoters held steady at 50.98%.

#3 Styrenix Performance Materials: The 33% ROCE Orphan Left by Its Global Parent

Incorporated in 1973, Styrenix Performance Materials was known as INEOS Styrolution India until its global parent sold out. It makes ABS and SAN resins, the engineering plastics behind fridge liners, helmet shells, radiator grilles and car interiors. It set up India’s first ABS plant.

Bhanshali holds 1,97,853 shares, about 1.1%, worth Rs 39.9 cr at the close of Rs 2,018 on 27^th August 2026. Like Greenlam, it has not moved in nine quarters.

The Margins Mirage: Why FY21’s 25% Spike Distorts the Growth Story

Promoter holding was 75% until March 2022. It fell to 62.73% and then to 46.24% by June 2024, where it has stayed. Over the same window domestic institutions went from 4.99% to 17.43%, while foreign holding shrank to 0.86%. A global parent stepping back while Indian funds absorb the paper is a vote on the asset by people who can visit the plant.

Let us look at the financials to see if we can see the reason for the fall.

Financial Year	FY21	FY22	FY23	FY24	FY25	FY26	5Y CAGR
Sales (Rs cr)	1,631	2,179	2,372	2,222	2,744	2,640	10%
EBITDA (Rs cr)	414	475	276	264	346	364	NM
Net Profit (Rs cr)	280	323	183	173	232	234	NM

Standalone figures, since consolidated accounts begin only in FY24 after the Thailand acquisition. EBITDA refers to operating profit before other income.

I have marked the profit growth rates as not meaningful, and the reason matters. FY21 and FY22 were freak years. Operating margins hit 25% and 22% against a long run history in the mid-single digits, because a global styrenics shortage let producers charge almost anything. Measuring growth from that peak tells you about a supply shock, not a business. The rupee columns do the honest work.

The June 2026 quarter was extraordinary on the consolidated books, boasting sales of Rs 1,011 cr, operating profit of Rs 220 cr and a 22% margin, against 10% a year earlier. Treat that margin as a spike until a second quarter confirms it, because raw material swings cut both ways.

The share price has compounded at 10% a year in the last 5 years.

Regarding valuations, the current PE is roughly 13x and the current industry median is 28x. The 10-Year median PE for the company is 70x while the industry median for the same period is 28x.

The company has a dividend yield of 2.68% and a standalone return on capital employed of 33%. That is the cheapest stock in this portfolio by a distance.

It is also the worst performer, down about 23% over one year. Consolidated borrowings have risen to Rs 548 cr as the company funds a Thailand plant and an ABS expansion. The December 2025 quarter, when margins fell to 4.8%, shows how lumpy these earnings are.

#4 On Door Concepts: The Microcap SME Retailer Quietly Erasing Its Debt

Incorporated in 2014, On Door Concepts is a Bhopal based grocery and household essentials retailer running supermarkets alongside an online ordering app. It listed on the NSE SME platform in late 2023 and is by far the smallest name here, at about Rs 172 cr.

Bhanshali holds 2,20,700 shares. As of the March 2026 filing that was 3.90%, his largest percentage stake anywhere, though worth only a little over Rs 6 cr.

Tracking the Grocery Turnaround

The recovery here is real. The company lost Rs 35 cr in FY19 and Rs 18 cr in FY20, and reserves were minus Rs 68 cr in FY22. By FY26 it earned Rs 11 cr on Rs 320 cr of sales, reserves stood at plus Rs 105 cr, and borrowings had fallen from Rs 112 cr to Rs 10 cr. Operating margin improved every year from 0.4% to 4.8%.

Let us look at the financials for the last 5 years.

Financial Year	FY21	FY22	FY23	FY24	FY25	FY26	5Y CAGR
Sales (Rs cr)	183	173	180	234	273	320	12%
EBITDA (Rs cr)	1	1	4	10	12	15	NM
Net Profit (Rs cr)	-5	-5	13	6	8	11	NM

EBITDA refers to operating profit before other income. Both growth rates are marked not meaningful for good reason. FY21 was a loss year, so no profit CAGR can be calculated from it, and an EBITDA base of roughly Rs 1 cr is too small for a percentage to mean anything. The FY23 profit of Rs 13 cr also came from Rs 13 cr of other income, not from selling groceries.

The SME Dilution Trap: Why Bhanshali’s 3.9% Stake is Shrinking on Paper

The company was listed in November 2023 on NSE’s SME platform, at a price of about Rs 180 and as on 28^th August 2026 the price was Rs 307.

Being listed on the SME platform comes with its own set of warnings, thanks to the lenient reporting standards and the mandate to trade in lots that makes leaving difficult in times of distress.

Now the caveat. In June 2026 the company issued 13,51,900 shares through a preferential allotment, and in July allotted 20 lakh warrants at Rs 156 each, a Rs 31.2 cr raise with Rs 7.8 cr upfront. Bhanshali did not sell a share. But on my arithmetic his 3.90% became about 3.15% after the allotment, and falls to roughly 2.45% if every warrant converts.

This matters for anyone reading shareholding tables. Promoter holding fell from 35.53% to 28.67% in the same quarter and foreign holding jumped from zero to 14.14%. None of that is selling. It is arithmetic. SME companies also file shareholding half yearly, which is why his stake goes quiet for months.

The Value Investor’s Waiting Game: Are These Stocks Worth the Illiquidity Risk?

The pattern is not a sector. It is a method. Sunflag’s price ignores an asset on its own balance sheet. Styrenix had an owner walk away and leave a cheap, cash generating plant behind. Greenlam’s profits are hidden by a finished capex cycle. On Door stopped losing money and nobody noticed.

Each is a gap between reported numbers and underlying value. That is banker’s work, not stock picking. It is also slow work, which explains why three of these four positions have not moved much in over two years.

The warning is that all four are small or micro cap, three carry heavy cyclical exposure, and one is an SME stock where a few thousand shares move the price. Bhanshali can wait years for a discount to close. Most people cannot, and it may not close at all. A sensible first step is to add these to a watchlist and read the next two quarters.

Disclaimer:

Note: We have relied on data from http://www.Screener.in and http://www.trendlyne.com throughout this article. Only in cases where the data was not available, have we used an alternate, but widely used and accepted source of information.

The purpose of this article is only to share interesting charts, data points and thought-provoking opinions. It is NOT a recommendation. If you wish to consider an investment, you are strongly advised to consult your advisor. This article is strictly for educative purposes only.

Suhel Khan has been a passionate follower of the markets for over a decade. During this period, he was an integral part of a leading Equity Research organisation based in Mumbai as the Head of Sales & Marketing. Presently, he is spending most of his time dissecting the investments and strategies of the Super Investors of India.

Disclosure: The writer and his dependents do not hold the stocks discussed in this article. The website managers, its employee(s), and contributors/writers/authors of articles have or may have an outstanding buy or sell position or holding in the securities, options on securities or other related investments of issuers and/or companies discussed therein. The content of the articles and the interpretation of data are solely the personal views of the contributors/writers/authors. Investors must make their own investment decisions based on their specific objectives, resources and only after consulting such independent advisors as may be necessary.