Mukul Agarwal and Madhusudan Kela back these 2 recently listed power microcaps

The first one builds the power electronics that let an electric locomotive turn current from the overhead wire into motion. The other fabricates the tall steel tubes a wind turbine sits on top of. One firm is a buyer of the grid while the other helps build it.

Two of the most followed names were already on the register. However, neither Madhusudan Kela nor Mukul Agarwal walked into the market this month and bought these shares. Both were on the register long before either listed. In one case the numbers say something sharper than a purchase. Let us take them one at a time.

#1 MV Electrosystems: The Tech Behind Electric Locomotives

Incorporated in 2009, MV Electrosystems makes electrical and power electronics equipment for railway rolling stock. Its main product is IGBT-based three-phase propulsion equipment for electric locomotives. That is the box that takes high voltage off the wire above the train and turns it into controlled power at the wheels. It also builds switchgear panels and vehicle control systems, and manufactures in Haryana.

Talking about the listing, the Rs 290 cr fresh issue was subscribed around 200 times, with anchors putting in Rs 130.5 cr. The stock has traded between Rs 687 and Rs 519 since, and closed at Rs 591 on 21^st August 2026, for a market value of Rs 1,613 cr.

Madhuri Madhusudan Kela, wife of the investor Madhusudan Kela, appears in the August shareholding filing at 4.22%, a position worth roughly Rs 65 cr. But look at where it came from. When the company filed its draft offer document in November 2025, she held 11.5 lakh shares, which was 5.6% of the company.

Kela Shareholding: A Case of Dilution, Not Fresh Buying

Here is the arithmetic, worth doing slowly. If 11.5 lakh shares came to 5.6%, the company had roughly 205 lakh shares before the issue. The IPO added 68.2 lakh new ones, taking the count to about 274 lakhs. Those same 11.5 lakh shares, measured against the larger count, work out to 4.20%. The filing says 4.22%.

So, she did not buy. She did not sell either. The company printed fresh shares, every existing slice got thinner, and hers went from 5.6% to 4.22% on its own. That is the most useful thing a reader can take from this filing. A first shareholding pattern after a listing shows you who was already there. It tells you nothing about who is buying now.

Operating Losses and Stretching Inventory Days

The financials are where this gets uncomfortable, and then interesting.

Financial Year	FY23	FY24	FY25	FY26	3Y CAGR
Sales (Rs cr)	68	50	63	49	-10%
EBITDA (Rs cr)	6	6	7	-10	NM
Net Profit (Rs cr)	1	1	1	-13	NM

EBITDA here means operating profit before other income. Two notes before you read those numbers. Only four years of accounts exist here, so a five-year growth rate cannot be worked out honestly and I have not tried. And FY26 turned negative at both the operating and net level. A rate running from a positive number to a negative one means nothing, so I have marked both NM or Not meaningful.

FY26 was bad on the face of it. Revenue fell about 22% to Rs 49 cr. There was an operating loss of Rs 10 cr and a net loss of Rs 12.6 cr. Return on capital was minus 15.1%. Cash from operations was an outflow of Rs 58 cr. Inventory days stretched to 731, the cash conversion cycle to 571 days.

The ₹921 Crore Order Book: A Lifeline from Indian Railways

Then the other half. Prototype approval from Chittaranjan Locomotive Works came in September 2025, and commercial supply only began in March 2026. FY26 was the year the old business faded and the new one had not yet started to bill. As of 30^th June 2026, the executable order book stood at Rs 921.64 cr, covering 564 propulsion units for the Chittaranjan, Banaras and Patiala locomotive works. Against FY26 revenue of Rs 49 cr, that is close to nineteen times a full year of sales.

That order book, not the profit and loss account, is what the Rs 1,551 cr market value is buying. The stock trades at about 31 times FY26 sales and has no price to earnings ratio at all, because there were no earnings. A ten-year median PE does not exist either, since it has been listed for fifteen days. I have left both out rather than dress up numbers with no history behind them.

High Working Capital and Single-Buyer Dependence

The risks are also quite plain. The 731 inventory days mean a lot of cash sits in parts waiting to be built. That is why Rs 180 cr of the issue money goes into long-term working capital and Rs 21 cr into research. Borrowings rose from Rs 32 cr to Rs 55 cr and interest cover is thin. Almost the entire order book traces back to one buyer, Indian Railways.

The board meets on 25th August for the June quarter. Those will be the first numbers this company has ever reported as a listed firm, and the first look at whether propulsion revenue has started to land.

#2 Anawil Wire and Engineering: Fabricating the Wind Power Push

Incorporated in January 2021, Anawil Wire and Engineering fabricates tubular steel windmill towers. It began with weldmesh, boiler parts and paper machinery components, and moved into wind towers only in 2023. Two plants, at Koppal in Karnataka and Kutch in Gujarat, span 48 acres with a combined capacity of 612 towers a year.

The issue raised Rs 177.81 cr, was subscribed about 99 times, and listed at Rs 329.65 against a price of Rs 270. Anchors put in Rs 50.64 cr across 19 names, including Sunil Singhania’s Abakkus Venture Opportunities Fund and Vikas Khemani’s Carnelian.

The stock closed at Rs 465 on 21^st August 2026, at a market value of Rs 1,163 cr. Mukul Agrawal, founder of Param Capital, shows up at 2.72%, roughly 6.88 lakh shares worth about Rs 29 cr. He too was in early.

Demystifying the 42% Operating Margin Illusion

Let us now look at the financials to get a better look at the numbers behind the machine.

Financial Year	FY23	FY24	FY25	FY26	3Y CAGR
Sales (Rs cr)	26	54	78	143	77%
EBITDA (Rs cr)	13	22	30	61	67%
Net Profit (Rs cr)	5	4	12	37	95%

As before, EBITDA means operating profit ahead of other income. Only four years of accounts exist here too, so three years is as far back as a growth rate can honestly go. The FY23 base is also small enough that these percentages flatter the business. Tower output rose from 114 in FY24 to 210 in FY26. Return on equity was 56.6% last year, and 42.9% averaged over three.

Then there is the 42.6% operating margin, which looks extraordinary for a steel fabricator. The company’s own investor presentation explains why. Anawil works under three arrangements. Under pure conversion the customer supplies the steel and Anawil charges only for the work, earning roughly 44% to 50%.

Add in-house internals and it drops to 33% to 37%. Under integrated supply, where Anawil buys the steel itself, margin falls to 14% to 16%, because that steel cost now sits inside revenue.

So, today’s 42.6% is largely conversion income on a small billing base. The company says as much, and adds that the percentage normalises downward as scope widens. Absolute profit can still rise. But anyone anchoring to a 42% margin is anchoring to a revenue mix, not a manufacturing edge.

Customer Concentration and the Monsoon Seasonality Trap

The order book was Rs 359.81 cr as on 31st March 2026, covering 379 towers. It came from six customers. Not sixty. Six. The top five customers were 78.75% of FY26 revenue, with the largest at 29.32%. And 93.87% of FY26 revenue came from a single state, Karnataka.

There is a timing trap here too. Wind towers cannot be installed easily in the rains, so 71.12% of FY26 revenue landed between October and March. Only 28.88% came in the April to September half. When Anawil reports a soft first half, that is the calendar, not a collapse. A fresh letter of intent for 38 towers worth Rs 120 cr arrived in the June quarter.

Cash is the softer spot. Profit before tax was Rs 44.5 cr in FY26, but cash from operations was only Rs 18.4 cr, because working capital swallowed close to Rs 90 cr. Free cash flow was negative Rs 75 cr. Borrowings more than doubled to Rs 128 cr as the Kutch plant went up, and year-end cash was Rs 1.6 cr.

Around Rs 115 cr of the issue proceeds repays debt, so the FY27 balance sheet should look very different. The accounts also carry a flag that the company may be capitalising interest cost.

Valuations and the Reality of SME Platform Illiquidity

On valuation, the stock trades at about 32 times earnings. The current industry median is 35x. So Anawil screens slightly cheaper against its sector. A ten-year median PE does not exist here either.

One more point, and it matters. Anawil sits on the SME platform, not the main board. You cannot buy a single share here; the lot is 400, which puts the smallest ticket above Rs 2 lakh. Reporting requirements are lighter than a main board company carries. And with only 3,684 shareholders on the register, trading is thin enough that a modest order can swing the price either way. Selling out in a hurry is not always possible.

Act or Wait for the Quarterly Results Before Buying?

With all the above numbers and insights, it is almost clear that both investors took their positions in private, before the public got a price. What August delivered was not a purchase but a valuation. For Kela, the first thing that valuation did was cut her percentage without touching a share.

Each carries the risk of its own end of the power trade. MV Electrosystems has a large order book, no profits yet, and one buyer. Anawil has real profits, real cash strain, six customers and one state. Neither is priced for disappointment.

The dates do the talking from here. MV Electrosystems reports on 25th August. Anawil’s first half will look soft because of the monsoon, and the question is what October to March delivers. The sensible move is to put both on a stock watchlist and let a few quarters of real numbers arrive before forming a view.

Disclaimer

Note: We have relied on data from http://www.Screener.in and http://www.trendlyne.com throughout this article. Only in cases where the data was not available, have we used an alternate, but widely used and accepted source of information.

The purpose of this article is only to share interesting charts, data points and thought-provoking opinions. It is NOT a recommendation. If you wish to consider an investment, you are strongly advised to consult your advisor. This article is strictly for educative purposes only.

Suhel Khan has been a passionate follower of the markets for over a decade. During this period, he was an integral part of a leading Equity Research organisation based in Mumbai as the Head of Sales & Marketing. Presently, he is spending most of his time dissecting the investments and strategies of the Super Investors of India.

Disclosure: The writer and his dependents do not hold the stocks discussed in this article. The website managers, its employee(s), and contributors/writers/authors of articles have or may have an outstanding buy or sell position or holding in the securities, options on securities or other related investments of issuers and/or companies discussed therein. The content of the articles and the interpretation of data are solely the personal views of the contributors/writers/authors. Investors must make their own investment decisions based on their specific objectives, resources and only after consulting such independent advisors as may be necessary.