Just figure this out. The global population, currently at 8.2 billion, is expected to peak at 10.3 billion in 2084 and then decline to 10.2 billion through the end of the century. Closer home, India’s population will continue to grow briefly from its current 1.5 billion to 1.7 billion, and then drop back to 1.5 billion by 2100—leaving the population unchanged after a 75-year period. India’s neighbour China, another country with one of the highest populations in the world, is expected to see a sharp drop from 1.4 billion people in 2025 to 633 million by 2100.
Globally, fertility rates are declining. In the 1960s, the average world fertility rate was nearly 5 births per woman. In 2024, the figure was 2.2, as per the United Nations’ World Fertility Report.
The population growth figures are also concerning. At the start of the 21st century, the Indian population was growing annually by an average of 20 million births or individuals. This number dropped to 13 million in 2024, and the number is expected to stop growing altogether by 2060, after which it will begin its certain decline, as per Data for India, a public research platform.
Several regions are experiencing population ageing as well. As per a report published by the World Bank last year, the proportion of people aged 65 years and older in Europe, Central Asia and North America is around 18%, while the same for people aged 0-14 years is 17%. As for India, in the early 1960s, 40% of the country’s population was under the age of 14 years. By 2025, this share was cut to half, as per Data for India research.
In fact, in another two decades, there will be more seniors over the age of 60 years than there will be children in India, stated a report titled India in Transition published by the Centre for Advanced Study of India.
Demographic change is happening, and real fast. From fewer new workers entering the labour force to more older people needing income support and healthcare, the population decline is predicted to pose serious concerns in the times to come, say experts.
Demographic transition
By 2050, 155 of 204 countries and territories (76%) in the world are projected to have fertility rates below the 2.1 replacement level, as per a March 2024 study in The Lancet. This ‘baby bust’ trend is forecast to intensify, with 198 nations (97%) falling below the replacement level by 2100.
A fertility rate of 2.1 live births per woman is generally needed to sustain a stable population size.
The Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), based at the University of Washington in Seattle, US, which aggregates health policy and practice data from around the globe, has published an analysis on declining populations.
Speaking of the research, Amanda Smith, assistant director of forecasting at IHME, elaborates, “Our estimates observe fertility rates declining globally, including in sub-Saharan Africa, which we forecast will continue. However, their fertility rate is not expected to drop below replacement level until much later this century, and so we expect that population will continue to grow until after that point.”
On a global scale, among the 10 countries projected to contribute the most to population growth, the US is the only one located outside of Africa and Asia, as per a 2025 population projection by the Pew Research Centre (PRC). Still, the US is expected to fall from the world’s third-most populous country today to the sixth-most populous by 2100.
The number of people aged 65 years and older is expected to more than double, from 857 million today to 2.4 billion by 2100. That would increase their share of the global population from 10% to 24%. Additionally, in the US, the past year recorded the slowest population growth rate since the Covid-19 pandemic, adding only 1.8 million people or 0.5% between July 2024 and July 2025, due to the decline in net international immigration. In the first wave of the pandemic in 2021, the US had seen a record low of 0.2% growth rate.
Nuances of the decline
Declining fertility rates have been observed historically in most countries. “In our model, female educational attainment, access to contraception, population density and under-5 mortality explain a majority of the historical changes in fertility, but there are of course other factors that could be contributing to declines in fertility and may be specific to local contexts,” says Smith of IHME.
Alok Bajpeyi, knowledge management head, Population Foundation of India (PFI), says, “The reason so many countries face this shift at roughly the same time is that fertility fell across much of the world between the 1970s and 2000s. Their age structures are now aligned, pushing many societies past the birth-death tipping point within a few decades of one another.”
“What this really means is that population decline is the standard end point of the demographic transition under modern conditions, with the real challenge lying in how quickly societies can adapt to ageing and slower growth, especially in countries like India that will age before becoming fully wealthy,” adds Bajpeyi.
The reasons for this decline in fertility rate and population are many and multifaceted, according to the United Nations World Population Prospects 2024 report released in 2025. The report indicates that urbanisation, increasing cost of living, health, housing and education, more women in the workforce, among other reasons, all contribute to the delay in family planning or the decision to not raise children. The financial strains of raising a family on the income of a set of parents is not a feasible option for most. This in turn leads to an imbalance in the senior citizen and working age population.
As for India, Rukmini S, founder of Data for India and a data communicator, elucidates the nuances of the population decline through her findings published in the form of a three-part article series in an online portal, starting with Not population ‘explosion’ but plunging fertility should worry India, in November last year. “Of the four states that are yet to reach replacement fertility, all of them lie in India’s impoverished centre and north,” she says, indicating lesser penetration of societal shifts, mobility for women and access to education. Bihar is expected to be the last state to achieve replacement fertility only in 2039.
In India too, she says, the total fertility rate (TFR) was the highest among the poorest 20% of Indian households, where the average woman had an estimated one child more on average than the average woman in the richest 20% of households. The gap between less and more educated women is similar: women with no schooling have an average of one child more than women with 12 or more years of schooling. However, over time, TFR has fallen in both richer and poorer households, and among women with more and less education.
She explains that when a country’s TFR drops to 2.1 (the global replacement rate), meaning that women will have an average of 2.1 children over their lifetimes, demographers say that the country has reached “replacement fertility”. She elaborates, “What this means is that if two adults have a notional 2.1 children between them, then, accounting for some likelihood of death, that couple will produce two adults, and the size of the population will remain the same.
This is a key milestone in a country’s demographic journey. If fertility falls below that level, the population will begin to decline in absolute numbers.”
“States such as Kerala and Tamil Nadu invested early in women’s education, health, and family planning, and today have fertility rates well below replacement, with no sign of a rebound despite economic growth and social support… Once smaller families become the norm and marriage and childbearing are delayed, financial incentives alone rarely change behaviour,” adds Bajpeyi.
Although longer lives are favourable, they pose a challenge in terms of economic and social welfare planning. A report titled Global Population Growth is Slowing Down published by the Council on Foreign Relations, a global affairs literacy organisation, said, “By 2100, 23 countries—including major economies such as Italy and Japan—will see their populations halve.”
According to Bajpeyi, there is a need for policy approaches tailored to state contexts and lifecourse needs, including reproductive health across ages”. “As most parts of India move past replacement fertility, concerns such as infertility care, maternal health, ageing and support systems become more relevant,” he adds.
It is important to note that fertility rates across Indian states also vary. Four states are yet to reach replacement fertility— Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, according to the India in Transition report, which also estimated that UP and MP would reach replacement fertility by 2025 and 2028, respectively. These four states still have a fertility rate of over 2.5, which is more than the replacement rate of 2.1. Additionally, life expectancy in India has grown over time—from under 50 years in 1970 to over 70 today.
Lasting impact
The United Nations World Population Prospects 2024 report released in 2025 anticipates that the global fertility rate will fall below the replacement threshold of 2.1 births per woman by 2050, a historic demographic shift. Explaining the impact of this population decline, Bajpeyi explains, “This means fewer new workers entering the labour force and more older people needing income support and healthcare. As a result, economic growth will rely less on population expansion and more on higher productivity, better skills, and higher labour participation, especially among women and older adults.”
He elaborates that fewer people in the working-age group will be supporting more older people, putting pressure on labour markets, pensions, healthcare systems, and public finances. “At the same time, countries may face labour shortages and slower consumption growth unless productivity improves or more women and older adults remain in the workforce.”
As has been established, by the end of the century, countries known for their exploding populations will have drastically different demographics.
Smith of IHME echoes Bajpeyi’s opinion, “Accelerated declines in fertility often create shifts in the age distribution of a population, such that there are more people that have aged out of the workforce compared to younger adults and children. This can create challenges for economies and governments to ensure adequate support for social services that rely on the workforce to financially support various programmes, and it can create additional demand for other types of healthcare services.”
In India’s case, as per PFI’s analyses, “This transition will occur while income levels are still relatively low, making adaptation more challenging and increasing the importance of investing in skills, health, and employment quality rather than relying on population growth alone.”
According to Rukmini S, whether or not this declining population and birth rate can or should be reversed is as yet unproven. “But in a short- to medium-term future in which declining birth rates are a reality, being on the right side of the evidence and clear-sighted about the consequences are urgent next steps,” she says.
In an article titled The Vanishing Youth published in Aeon, a globally renowned culture magazine, Victor Kumar, a philosopher and assistant professor at Boston University, writes on the population crisis, noting that population growth drives economic growth. “New generations drive economic growth, pioneer technologies, challenge outdated moral views, create art, and advance social change. They’re more likely to take risks, embrace new ideas, and imagine different futures. When we talk about population decline, what we’re really talking about is the gradual dissipation of this vital social force,” he writes.
He predicts, “As fewer young people are born to replenish society, we’ll face a shrinking workforce, weakening consumer demand, and the unravelling of economies of scale.”
Countering the crisis
Population experts and many governments have woken up to the fact that steadily declining population rates point to a bleak if not uncertain future.
China appears cognisant of this impending demographic shift, evident in their government’s multiple efforts to boost and encourage childbirth, such as taxation of contraceptive products like condoms, and leader Xi Jinping’s call for a “new type of marriage and childbearing culture”. The number of births for every 1,000 people fell to 5.63, the lowest level on record since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, as per reports.
The UN Population report states: “Because GDP and economic strength are significant indicators of a country’s prosperity and influence in the world, governments go to great lengths to monitor and shape population trends to avoid threats to growth.” Like China, Japan, too, has introduced measures to combat dropping fertility rates and a potential future with a low youth population. These measures include mandating a 12-month parental leave, offering direct financial aid to parents, and investing heavily in subsidised childcare.
The Japanese government has even backed an artificial intelligence matchmaking service to increase its birth rate. By 2100, the Japanese population is expected to consist of over 50% of people over the age of 40, as opposed to a mere 25.33% in 2024. Currently, Japan has the oldest aged population globally, with nearly a third of its citizens aged 65 or older, according to UN World Population Prospects 2024.
However, Bajpeyi of PFI is doubtful. “Evidence from China, Japan, and India suggests that pro-natal policies may not reverse low fertility in a lasting way. Despite cash incentives, childcare subsidies, and extended parental leave, fertility in Japan has remained around 1.2 and China’s has fallen close to 1.0, according to official government data, showing limited public response.”
Bajpeyi adds that countries like Sweden and Norway, which offer long paid leave and universal childcare, have historically maintained higher fertility rates than many other countries in Europe, though not at replacement level. “These measures may slow decline at the margins, but they are not futuristically sound as a strategy to restore high fertility, nor are they likely to gain strong public acceptance unless deeper issues like living costs, job insecurity, and work–family balance are addressed,” he says.
Apart from China and Japan, certain European countries have also taken up measures to battle the slowing population growth and longer life expectancies, with France and the Netherlands extending the retirement age to retain people in the workforce. However, according to the Council of Foreign Research, this move was met with displeasure and protests from the public for workers’ rights. On the other hand, countries like Australia and Canada have adopted more open immigration policies to allow more working age individuals into the country.
As Bajpeyi points out, India has had active pronatal policies for antenatal support, maternal and newborn health, with schemes like the Pradhan Mantri Surakshit Matritva Abhiyan, wherein the beneficiaries are women with high-risk pregnancies who are afforded three free check ups, and comprehensive prenatal care in the second and third semesters. These policies and schemes have been in effect for years, with one of the first being the Janani Suraksha Yojna which provided women with conditional cash transfers (based on their need) to promote institutional deliveries. Evidently, however, these measures have not been able to drag up the fertility rate of the country.
