‘Important part of India’: What Sergio Gor’s Kashmir visit says about Washington’s changing approach

Gor, who is visiting Kashmir for the first time, also called the region “incredibly beautiful.” On the surface, the comments were simple. However, in Srinagar, New Delhi, Islamabad and Washington, the words carried much more weight because of the long and complicated history of US stand on the Kashmir issue.

Gor is also US President Donald Trump’s Special Envoy for South and Central Asia. His visit is notable because he is the first serving US ambassador to meet a sitting Jammu and Kashmir chief minister in more than 15 years. He is also the first American envoy to visit the Union Territory since the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019, the Galwan Valley clashes in 2020 and Operation Sindoor in 2024.

For decades, Washington has called for a diplomatic engagements to solve the Kashmir dispute. India has strongly opposed any third-party role. Hence, this makes Gor’s visit important not necessarily because it shows a major change in US policy, but because of what it says about how Washington is approaching Kashmir today.

A visit seven years in the making

Gor’s visit comes seven years after the Indian government removed Jammu and Kashmir’s special status and made it a union territory.

The visit was carefully presented as a friendly engagement. Gor met Omar Abdullah and spoke about Kashmir’s economic ties with the United States. Washington also indicated that it would review its Level 4 “do not travel” advisory for the region and consider whether the warning still reflected conditions on the ground.

Gor pointed to improvements in security in Kashmir as one reason for reviewing the advisory. He is also expected to meet Jammu and Kashmir Lieutenant Governor Manoj Sinha before travelling to Ladakh. There has been speculation that he could meet trade representatives and civil society members in Srinagar, although such meetings have not been confirmed.

Omar Abdullah, however, was careful not to present the visit as a diplomatic breakthrough. “Washington won’t solve our problems; the Centre will.” Abdullah has continued to focus his political efforts on New Delhi, particularly on the restoration of full statehood to Jammu and Kashmir.

New Delhi has traditionally resisted Washington’s offer to meditate in the Kashmir issue. At the same time, there is room for US engagement on issues such as investment, trade and tourism.

Gor’s visit therefore appears to be opening a door to greater economic engagement without necessarily opening the door to American mediation on Kashmir.

The last comparable standalone visit by a US ambassador was made by Kenneth Juster in 2018. Before him, Timothy Roemer met Abdullah in 2011. After the August 2019 changes, foreign officials and journalists faced severe restrictions on visiting the Valley.

In January 2020, New Delhi organised a two-day visit for 15 ambassadors, including the then-US envoy. But the trip was criticised because the visiting diplomats did not meet detained Kashmiri political leaders and because critics viewed it as a tightly controlled presentation of normalcy rather than an independent assessment of conditions in the Valley.

Washington’s stand during 1990s

The United States has spent most of its history following an interesting approach to Kashmir. That is, India and Pakistan should resolve the dispute themselves.

Washington’s position was based largely on the 1972 Simla Accord and the 1999 Lahore Declaration. Successive US administrations avoided formally offering mediation, even though American officials have repeatedly described Kashmir as one of the world’s most dangerous flashpoints.

The reason is obvious.India and Pakistan, both nuclear-armed nations, have experienced repeated periods of tension over Kashmir, at times escalating into military conflict.

During a 2019 House hearing, Congressman Brad Sherman described Kashmir as “the most dangerous geopolitical flashpoint in the world” because it involved two nuclear powers.

The United States has intervened during major crises, but usually without trying to resolve the territorial dispute itself. During the 1999 Kargil conflict, for example, President Bill Clinton personally intervened. His diplomacy helped prevent the conflict from becoming a war, but Washington did not turn that intervention into a mediation effort on the larger Kashmir question.

India has historically been deeply suspicious of outside involvement. New Delhi has argued that Kashmir is a bilateral matter and that bringing in third parties could give Pakistan greater diplomatic space.

This position is rooted in India’s approach to its relationship with major powers and international institutions. New Delhi has generally believed that it should handle disputes with Pakistan directly rather than allow outside countries to shape the discussion.

How the Kashmir dispute began

The Kashmir dispute itself goes back to the partition of British India in 1947. At the time, Jammu and Kashmir was a Muslim-majority princely state ruled by a Hindu monarch. The ruler eventually chose to accede to India, a decision Pakistan challenged.

The 1947-48 conflict ended with a UN-brokered ceasefire. The United Nations Security Council passed 18 resolutions on the dispute over the following decades. One of the most important was UNSCR 47 of April 1948. This vote was never held because the conditions required for it were not fulfilled.

India and Pakistan also had major conflicts in 1965, 1971 and 1999. China also became involved in the wider territorial dispute after the 1962 India-China war, when China took control of Aksai Chin.

Washington’s record of direct mediation remained limited. A US-UK effort in 1961-62 failed after India refused to give up the Kashmir Valley. Even Clinton’s role during the Kargil war focused on preventing escalation rather than settling the dispute itself.

Article 370 and US

Article 370 was closely connected to the original political relationship between Jammu and Kashmir and India. The provision was negotiated in 1949-50 and gave Jammu and Kashmir special constitutional status. It required the state’s consent before New Delhi could make laws on subjects beyond defence, foreign affairs and communications.

A 1954 presidential order later introduced Article 35A. It gave the state the power to define permanent residents and restricted access to certain property rights, government jobs and educational opportunities.

For decades, the BJP and its ideological predecessors campaigned for the removal of Article 370. They argued that the provision created a constitutional distinction that was inconsistent with national unity.

Critics on the other side argued that the autonomy provided by Article 370 had already been reduced over the years because successive presidential orders had extended many Indian laws to Jammu and Kashmir.

Article 370 was finally scrapped in August 2019, when the government also reorganised Jammu and Kashmir into a union territory. This decision fundamentally changed the political and constitutional landscape of the region and created a new challenge for Washington.

The Pulwama crisis and a bystander Washington

The events leading up to the removal of Article 370 were already tense. In February 2019, an explosives-laden vehicle struck a paramilitary convoy in Pulwama, killing at least 40 personnel. The attack was claimed by Jaish-e-Mohammad, a Pakistan-based organisation designated as a terrorist group by the United States.

India responded with air strikes on a Jaish facility inside Pakistan. It was the first such Indian strike inside Pakistan since 1971.

The White House condemned the Pulwama attack and called on Pakistan to take action against terrorist groups operating from its territory. However, former US officials later described Washington’s role during the crisis as relatively passive.

Then came another major diplomatic surprise.

In July 2019, Trump said that Prime Minister Narendra Modi had asked him to mediate on Kashmir. His statement – made alongside Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan – caused a huge uproar in India. Opposition MPs staged a walkout in Parliament, while External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar told lawmakers that PM Modi had made no such request.

Jaishankar reaffirmed India’s long-standing position that Kashmir could only be discussed directly between India and Pakistan.

The US State Department then moved to clarify the position, saying Kashmir remained a bilateral matter while adding that Washington would assist if both sides sought its mediation.

The episode raised concerns in New Delhi because it came at a time when Trump was developing warmer ties with Khan and the United States was supporting an IMF bailout for Pakistan. Some analysts believe the episode added to Indian concerns about Washington’s approach to Pakistan and Kashmir.

Article 370 and Washington’s careful hedge

When India revoked Article 370 in August 2019, the US described the move as an internal Indian matter but also expressed concern about the security measures that followed.

A State Department spokesperson said the US was “concerned about reports of detentions” and called for respect for individual rights.

The government in New Delhi imposed a major security crackdown. India’s Home Ministry later told Parliament that more than 5,100 people had been placed in “preventive custody” in the months after August 5, 2019.

Among those detained were former chief ministers Omar Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti. Schools were closed and communications were restricted, including internet, mobile and landline services.

The Indian government defended the measures as necessary because of the security threat. Critics and independent observers described the restrictions as excessive and pointed to reports of protests, arrests and the use of force.

Members of the US Congress were more critical of India’s actions than the Trump administration.

Eliot Engel, then chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, accused the administration of giving India a pass on human rights and democratic norms.

Brad Sherman again raised concerns about the danger posed by Kashmir because of the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan.

A Senate Appropriations Committee report called for telecommunications services to be restored, the lockdown to be lifted and detainees to be released.

However, these criticisms did not become major changes in US policy. They remained largely in the form of congressional statements, hearings and non-binding resolutions.

The international reaction was also significant. Pakistan downgraded diplomatic relations with India, suspended trade and pushed for UN involvement. The UN Security Council held a closed-door discussion on Kashmir in August 2019, the first such meeting in decades.

China also objected to the change in Jammu and Kashmir’s status and called for restraint. The UN Secretary-General urged restraint. However, the UN human rights chief expressed serious concern about the situation. European leaders and lawmakers also raised questions about conditions in Kashmir.

The Indus Waters Treaty opens another front

The Kashmir dispute returned to the centre of India-Pakistan tensions in a different way in April 2025. This time, the issue was water.

Following the April 22 Pahalgam terror attack, India announced that the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty would be held “in abeyance with immediate effect.” Pakistan denied involvement in the attack and described India’s decision as an act of war and a violation of international law.

The treaty was brokered by the World Bank and does not contain an expiry clause. Its provisions also require mutual agreement for changes under Article XII.

Regardless of these legal questions, India moved ahead with its decision. Reports said work began on reservoir-flushing operations at hydropower projects and that construction timelines for projects on the Chenab River were being accelerated.

India has continued to maintain that the treaty will remain suspended until Pakistan ends its support for cross-border terrorism. Unlike the Article 370 episode, Washington largely stayed away from the water dispute. There was no similar US statement describing the issue as an “internal matter.”

May 2025: From bystander to would-be mediator

The United States did, however, become much more visible during the military confrontation that followed. India carried out strikes at terrorist infrastructure deep inside. The two countries then exchanged fire for several days before announcing a ceasefire.

Trump said the United States had helped broker a ceasefire and said he wanted to work with India and Pakistan towards a Kashmir “solution.” Secretary of State Marco Rubio also said the two countries had agreed to hold wider talks at a neutral location.

While Pakistan welcomed the American role, India said the ceasefire had been achieved through direct military-to-military contact rather than Trump administrations’ mediation. PM Modi reportedly told Trump that India would not accept third-party mediation on Kashmir, a position Indian officials publicly reinforced.

Trump nevertheless continued to speak about finding a solution. At one point, he said he would help find a solution “after a thousand years.” The remarks triggered criticism in India, with Congress leader Sachin Pilot warning against the “internationalisation” of the Kashmir issue.

India’s response has remained consistent throughout – Kashmir is a bilateral issue, and New Delhi does not want an outside power deciding the terms of the discussion.