High on the list of President Donald Trump\u2019s priorities as he tries to close a trade deal with counterpart Xi Jinping is making sure China faces consequences if it doesn\u2019t live up to its promises. Yet in pursuing that goal Trump may also be giving China a new cudgel to use on American companies and striking another blow to the international rule of law. Treasury secretary Steven Mnuchin has said the US has made its own commitments to China and agreed that both sides will be subject to an enforcement mechanism. \u201cThis will be a two-way agreement in enforcement,\u2019\u2019 Mnuchin said Monday, after saying over the weekend that the US would be open to \u201ccertain repercussions\u201d. Details of the US commitments and how the enforcement mechanism will operate remain scant. But Mnuchin\u2019s comments have caused plenty of raised eyebrows from legal scholars to the business community and Congress. READ ALSO |\u00a0Unemployment doubled in last 8 years; 50 lakh jobs lost since demonetisation If the US allows China reciprocal enforcement powers, it would make China \u201cjudge, jury and executioner as to whether we have honoured our obligations\u201d, said Daniel Price, who served as a senior economic adviser to President George W Bush and is now at Rock Creek Global Advisors in Washington. \u201cI don\u2019t think the US business community is sufficiently alert to the risk of constantly being exposed to unilateral enforcement action by China.\u201d The Trump administration wants to have a mechanism that would allow it to quickly punish any foot-dragging by Chinese officials by imposing tariffs or other sanctions without having to go through the World Trade Organization or other adjudicators that they argue have been ineffective in the past. But any reciprocal deal would give Chinese leaders another way to quickly apply their own pressure on American companies. The mechanism being contemplated, US officials have said, would require consultations between US and Chinese officials over disputes but ultimately allow either side to impose trade sanctions unilaterally. The deal may also see both sides agree to forego their right to retaliate or challenge any enforcement action by the other at the WTO. Business groups have declined to comment publicly about Mnuchin\u2019s statements, saying the model of the enforcement system isn\u2019t clear yet. Lobbyists nevertheless complain they\u2019re not being consulted by the administration and fret that once a deal is announced American companies will be forced to accept it as a fait accompli. Robert Lighthizer, the US trade representative who previously indicated the US would insist on unilateral enforcement powers, has said he\u2019s not planning to seek approval from Congress for a China deal. The administration is though already facing disquiet in Congress over the impact of tariffs, its authority to impose them and the perception by lawmakers that they\u2019ve been largely left in the dark during the deal-making process. Congressional aides say concerns about Trump\u2019s trade policies are only likely to grow on Capitol Hill if a deal gives China power to strike American exports as it wishes. At its extreme such a construction would also be a blow to the WTO as the independent arbiter of global trade rules. The Trump administration is already attacking the WTO\u2019s dispute settlement system by blocking the appointment of new appellate judges. A US-China deal would take things a step further. Jennifer Hillman, a former WTO judge who teaches at Georgetown University, said while trade pacts often include dispute mechanisms the brewing US-China pact would be unique if it didn\u2019t have a role for third-party arbitrators. It also could see much of the WTO case load go away with the US and China historically two of the biggest users of the dispute system. \u201cWhen it is the two biggest countries that have brought the majority of cases at the WTO, it is a big blow to the system,\u201d Hillman said. Administration officials argue that Trump has a more pragmatic approach to trade than previous presidents, one that views prior US commitments such as to the WTO and its rules through the lens of self-interest.