Although the WTO has expressed its right to adjudicate security exceptions invoked by members under Article XXI of GATT, it remains to be seen whether WTO members, particularly major powers, accept this point of view.
What is perhaps becoming increasingly clear is that the Supreme Court’s judgment has provided the framework for RBI and the DIPP to push hard on data nationalisation.
Why aren’t the large costs of local data storage capacities deterring American payment system providers from operating in India? The answer is the size of the Indian market.
India remains opposed on the larger ground that such talks can obliterate progress on many pending issues on the DDA and on the more specific ground of e-commerce talks to be embedded in the WTO’s original digital trade age
For the first time, however, India encounters a US trade administration that is determined to wipe out trade deficits. Such an attitude is much different from responding to challenges that are regulatory in nature, such as in
A wider pool of companies participating in trials augurs well for the long-term prospects of 5G growth in India from both price and service efficiency perspectives.
The US security perspective on trade is not limited to blocking imports for reducing dependence on foreign products. It extends to securing greater global access for key US industries in major markets. This objective of the F
While advancing ‘Made in China’ is a core objective of the Belt and Road Initiative, ‘America first’ appears to be a similar objective for the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. This is hardly the way the FOIP can expect to
While India is a lesser evil than, say, China for the US as far as its role in contributing to the US’s global trade deficit is concerned, expect H1-B clamp down, closer IP scrutiny.
US trade actions don’t note the complexity of modern trade in terms of its decentralised organisation across locations. Hitting a ‘made in China’ labelled item might end up inflicting more damage not on China, but on th
The pace picked up by the negotiations, and the quick frequency with which trade ministers have met this year, holds out hope for a deal. Even if a low-quality RCEP comes through, it will bring some cheer for the moribund wor
The current policy of integrating existing coastal SEZs into the overarching plan of coastal development under ‘Sagarmala’ can lead to a turnaround for SEZs.
It is well known that India’s domestic infrastructure is not up to the global standards. It is also a common knowledge that low quality infrastructure raises business costs and reduces global competitiveness.
India will be hosting the third annual meeting of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) at Mumbai, in June this year. This is a significant occasion for various reasons.
Economic corridors have hardly been as controversial as China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI). It could have avoided controversies if it had proceeded in a consultative fashion like multi-country cross-border corridors.
If the strategy is to stay away from FTAs since they enable imports, India might as well give up hopes of becoming a global manufacturing hub and manufacturing exporter in the foreseeable future
Multilateral, bilateral and regional approaches to international trade were celebrated, respectively, by China, the US and Asia-Pacific members of the TPP11.
The circumstances in Asia are poised to experience a new competition between China and Japan, or more specifically, Xi and Abe. Both would employ economics and enhanced supply of public goods as the main planks of their effor
The weight other South Asian countries attach to the Chinese influence is much larger than they attach to frictionless ties with India, given these countries also run trust deficits with India.
Governing digital trade and data flow through trade agreements faces the challenge of moving into areas that are difficult to regulate, given their overlap with other complex trade issues
such as IPR
