Notwithstanding the agreement, tariffs imposed by both sides on each other’s products during the last two years, continue. To that extent, the maximum comfort that can be derived from the deal is the signal that while the d
India needs to import bulk consumer goods, and intermediates because of their insufficient availability, and higher prices. Even after tariffs, these imports remain competitive vis-à-vis domestic products.
Although the WTO has expressed its right to adjudicate security exceptions invoked by members under Article XXI of GATT, it remains to be seen whether WTO members, particularly major powers, accept this point of view.
India remains opposed on the larger ground that such talks can obliterate progress on many pending issues on the DDA and on the more specific ground of e-commerce talks to be embedded in the WTO’s original digital trade age
For the first time, however, India encounters a US trade administration that is determined to wipe out trade deficits. Such an attitude is much different from responding to challenges that are regulatory in nature, such as in
The US security perspective on trade is not limited to blocking imports for reducing dependence on foreign products. It extends to securing greater global access for key US industries in major markets. This objective of the F
While advancing ‘Made in China’ is a core objective of the Belt and Road Initiative, ‘America first’ appears to be a similar objective for the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. This is hardly the way the FOIP can expect to
US trade actions don’t note the complexity of modern trade in terms of its decentralised organisation across locations. Hitting a ‘made in China’ labelled item might end up inflicting more damage not on China, but on th