If there is a lesson to be learnt from Indo-Pak meetings, it is that, as the host, New Delhi must have the last word. As Pakistan foreign secretary Salman Bashir spoke to the press, following his meeting with India?s foreign secretary Nirupama Rao, his take on the meeting was completely at odds with the Indian line, which made clear that the talks were about addressing India?s concerns about terrorism. Period. But Salman Bashir gave the impression that as Pakistan, too, was a victim of terror?never mind its home-grown monsters?he had come to Delhi to talk about the ?core issue? of Kashmir. All the evidence India had painfully put together about following the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, was only ?literature?, regardless of the established link between Pakistan?s intelligence agencies (the state) and terror groups (the non-state actors), especially the Lashkar-e-Taiba, now being called the new Al Qaeda.
After threatening Pakistan with all possible options (possibly a military strike as well) India?s anti-Pakistan chorus ended in a whimper with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh deciding?as has been the case with his two predecessors Vajpayee and Gujral?that he must put the burden of the past aside and give Pakistan back its diplomatic respectability. Therefore, by resuming talks, India let slip this opportunity to put Pakistan in the dock permanently. Clearly, the Sharm-al-Sheikh?s meeting between the prime ministers of the two countries and the unwanted, but poorly drafted joint statement that followed had shown that New Delhi had lost the plot. Though India might still insist that there were simply talks about talks?far from the usual composite dialogue process?Pakistan approached the meeting having known that they have once again outsmarted New Delhi! No wonder its foreign secretary said at the press conference, ?We are in no hurry now for composite dialogue to be resumed.? Clearly, they had regained lost ground from isolation and were back in the game. Pakistan?s civilian leadership that New Delhi (and Washington) is so keen to strengthen has done nothing to further India?s request to bring masterminds of the 26/11 attacks to book. In fact, its interior minister, Rehman Malik, had blamed elements within India for the attack!
Pakistan?s focus was clearly on the Kashmir issue, and its foreign secretary, like all his predecessors, came to India with a clear brief from the military establishment at GHQ Rawalpindi. This is a point that often misses the imagination of India?s media, its politicians and even many of our diplomats?that talking to Pakistan’s foreign secretary is meaningless without involving the Pakistani military brass hats, as Pakistan?s foreign secretary, unlike India?s, has no freedom even on foreign policy issues. He does what he is told by its military men and, therefore, Bashir at his hour-long press conference on February 25 not only harped on their usual claim over Kashmir, but even cautioned India not to raise the spectre of a nuclear war (something which Pakistan often does), by stating that India?s army Chief had talked about a doctrine that should prepare India for a two-front war (against Pakistan and China) under a new nuclear overhang. Even a schoolgoing child with some idea of the history will say to this assertion, ?not new?.
What in fact is new is the prominent presence of the US in the security calculations of Pakistan, especially with Washington paying for Pakistan?s economic bailout and insisting that Pakistan concentrate more on the Af-Pak border and not remain focused on the Indo-Pak border. But that is something that Pakistan?s military brass cannot do because (a) Pakistan?s army is no exception and is well prepared to fight the last war and they are very averse to any changes in their strategic and military calculations. No wonder Pakistan’s army chief General Kayani had recently stated that his army?s focus will continue to be on India. Moreover, that is one of the reasons why Pakistan?s army has been unable to effectively battle insurgence at home. And (b) Pakistan?s army retains its importance in public life because it has built itself up as the ?guardian of the Pakistani state? and with India as its primary threat. Even the supplies of US weapons for the Af-Pak region are aimed at India. Thus, an anti-Indian stance gives them a pre-eminent political and social position in Pakistani society, and whatever the US and India might try, Pakistan?s military will not shed its anti-India obsession. It is the writing on the wall that any realist can read and only fools tend to ignore.
In fact, Pakistan?s obsession with Afghanistan is also part of its anti-India grand strategy. Around 1990, Pakistan?s military came up with the idea of dominating Afghanistan to create a ?strategic depth? for Pakistan in that country. This would, in the event of Indian invasion of Pakistan, provide the fallback position for Pakistan?s military and its political leadership in Afghanistan, to launch a fresh counter-offensive to drive India out. But this very thesis is flawed because it works on the assumption that India will be the aggressor, while India has a record of respecting status quo, as was seen in the liberation of Bangladesh. And by assuming that Indian forces would take over Pakistan, their politico-military elite has accepted the view that they are willing to be driven out of Pakistan, which is simply impossible for India to implement. However, Pakistan?s obsession with Afghanistan has led it to do everything possible to maintain a prominent presence in any policy discourse on the future of Afghanistan. This they did most effectively at the recent London conference, and showed that despite India?s huge investments in that country (about $1.5 billion), Islamabad wanted New Delhi out of the high table on the future of Afghanistan. And, in another sad blow to our diplomacy, apparently India will be shown the door soon! The US wants a face-saving exit from Afghanistan and Pakistan can give it that, not India.
Further emboldened, Pakistan has been using various Taliban hardline terror outfits (its strategic assets) to target India?s embassy and Indians. The most recent attack in Kabul on Indian that claimed about 10 lives is part of Pakistani strategy to drive Indians out of Afghanistan. For this, they have been using groups like the ones led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyr and Jalaluddin Haqqani and others. Worse still, they have got New Delhi to accept through their patrons in Washington that there is a ?good Taliban? and a ?bad Taliban?. In reality, the good Taliban are those that can be bright and the bad ones are those that continue to eye American and Pakistanis as their enemy. In short, Pakistan?s regional strategy remains somewhat constant and blurred. The tragedy is that India?s policy with Pakistan is often filled with surprises. While surprise is certainly a valuable principle of war, in diplomacy it can leave you red faced. The more important question for India is Pakistan itself, not Afghanistan. The answer lies in confronting the monster head on and not to wait for the US to show us the way. This will be our test to be a big power, because being America’s lackey in the region will do us little good.
To get Pakistan to accept India?s concerns, New Delhi must think out of the box and use whatever leverage it can over Islamabad. The US is only concerned about its own interest, and thus Shashi Tharoor?s idea of using the Saudis as interlocutors is a good one. If we want a solution, we have to go beyond bilateralism. For too long our establishment has parroted the line of bilateral talks being the only way out, but it has led us nowhere. This is a fig leave to hide our embarrassment after the debacle at Shimla in 1972, when we gave away over 90,000 PoWs to ZA Bhutto on the promise of keeping Indo-Pak relations bilateral. Nothing more.
?The writer is mentor of Security Watch India, a Delhi-based think tank
