This means China is unlikely to act as a brake on the global economy in the months aheaddespite the recent weak manufacturing figures. It also suggests that predictions of a credit crunch or financial crisis in China will likely prove wrongor at least premature.
To welcome stronger bank lending in China is not to deny that credit growing at double the gross domestic product growth is unsustainable and will ultimately have to be curbed. The Chinese authorities themselves clearly believe this. The government and the central bank want to reduce credit growth and to replace the unregulated, opaque shadow lending system with properly supervised, well-capitalised modern banks.
The government has two other economic objectives, however, that it sees as equally or more important.
The three priorities were clearly set out at the Communist Party Third Plenum last November. First, the Chinese economy must be restructured away from over-dependence on infrastructure investment and exports, towards private businesses that increase the quantity and quality of consumer goods and services.
The second prioritythough many observers would argue that this is the overriding objectiveis to ensure that restructuring occurs in an orderly manner, without risking a severe slowdown that might threaten the Communist Partys monopoly of power. In practice, the government has quantified this objective in target of 7.5% GDP growth.
Chinas third major economic objective is reforming financing and restraining excessive credit growth.
The problem, which Chinese leaders and economists were long reluctant to acknowledge, is what happens if these three objectives clash. What if restraining credit growth causes a severe economic slowdown Or if clamping down on shadow banking starves private enterprises of the working capital for growth Or if aggressive industrial restructuring becomes incompatible with financial stability
In the past few months, the answers to such questions have become clearer. While Chinese leadership remain genuinely committed to all three major economic objectivesindustrial restructuring, economic stability and financial reformthey now acknowledge that progress may not be possible simultaneously on all three fronts. Policy will therefore have to be prioritised. And the financial reform objective is proving a less important priority than industrial restructuring and maintaining an acceptable rate of growth.
Whenever possible, China will likely try to move ahead on all three objectives. But if there is a serious conflict, maintaining an adequate growth rate will trump credit restraint and financial reform.
This is a sensible ordering of prioritiesboth for China and for the world economy still desperately short of growth. Yet even if China is determined to keep its economy expanding and avoid a credit crunch, is it capable of doing this
After all, the US government allowed the failure of a medium-sized investment bank to degenerate into the greatest financial meltdown in modern history. Why, then, should we expect China do any better
Partly because Washington did not really try to avoid a financial crisis. On the contrary, the Treasury deliberately pushed Lehman Brothers into bankruptcy, to demonstrate that there were limits to government bank bailouts. Some Chinese officials, particularly central bankers, have recently made similar statements, suggesting reckless lending must be disciplined and moral hazard curbed.
Does this suggest that China could do a Lehman and reverse the order of policy prioritiesputting a financial clean-up ahead of economic growth
This is where the debate about Chinese policy gets really interestingand confusing.
Like other central banks, the Peoples Bank of China, if left to itself, would probably favour curbing excess lending and moral hazardeven if this jeopardised economic growth and industrial restructuring.
Though China is seen as a monolithic authoritarian state where only one view prevails on any important issue, economic policy is in fact subject to intense debatesometimes as open as the clashes between US Keynesians and monetarists or between southern European governments and the Bundesbank.
As a result, mixed messages flow constantly from China. These are particularly confusing for financiers whose instinct is to treat central bankers as more authoritative than politicians. In China, this is completely wrong, since the Peoples Bank of China is not independent and can take no major decisions without the political leaderships consent.
Occasionally Western-educated PBOC officials who crave independence may overstep the mark and make controversial decisions without government approval. Whenever such freelancing leads to a risk of crisisas it did last month when the central bank almost allowed a panic in shadow bankingthe Chinese Communist Party reasserts itself and a government bailout is arranged.
Which leads us back to the question of whether China, with its primitive financial system, has the tools to maintain financial stability if it really wants to. The answer is almost certainly yes.
A relatively primitive financial system, dominated by state-owned banks that are really just arms of the central government, is actually easier to stabilise than a complex market-driven network of private financial institutions. State-controlled banks may be inefficient at allocating capitalbut they cannot be forced into insolvency unless the government itself is insolvent. And the Chinese government is perhaps the most solvent financial entity in the world.
The central government has a cast-iron budgetary position that is more than adequate to underwrite the bailouts of insolvent banks and local governments. Even more important, China has the worlds largest trade surplus, total control over cross-border capital flows and $3.5 trillion in foreign exchange reserves.
Anyone betting on a Lehman-style meltdown in the Chinese financial system will need $3.5 trillion to call Beijings bluff.