The hue and cry that is being raised by the BJP and Left Parties about India?s proposed nuclear deal with the US may have made (a strange sort of) sense had India been alone in sticking out its neck. That, at least, may have suggested that the government at the Centre was taking undue risks, bartering away sovereignty.
Sceptics may doubt that, thinking that you can fool some of the people all of the time. But they also know that you cannot fool all of the people all of the time?and altogether too many countries have been queuing up to sign up 123 agreement for peaceful cooperation with the US. They surely merit a second look?
They include such UNSC nuclear stalwarts as the People?s Republic of China, Russia?plus members of the Nuclear Supply Group (NSG) like Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland and Ukraine.
None of these nations appear to be unduly worried?either about issues of national sovereignty, or about the conditionalities embodied in the so-called 123 agreement, although the latter derive from the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Even Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, Taiwan and Thailand are signatories to 123 agreement?as is Norway, a country that zealously guards its sovereign rights.
This disregard for ?going it alone? in matters of defence strategy should be noted by all those who inveigh against the 123 agreement. They need to wake up to the new reality of cooperation in nuclear trade, technology and materials.
As for the instance in hand, no significant nuclear transaction can occur before the US State Department has negotiated an agreement that meets the criteria which have been set out in Section 123 a (1) through (9), 42 USC 2151, with the advice of the Department of Energy. While such an agreement would not address specific programmes, it would provide a framework of non-proliferation controls for commercial nuclear energy transactions. And, to repeat, what is so surprising is the number of countries that have opted in.
Take Brazil: the agreement which it has negotiated in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (amended by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, or otherwise) provides a comprehensive framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation between the US and Brazil under appropriate conditions and controls. It reflects a strong common commitment to the goals of nuclear non-proliferation. The latest agreement, in fact, supersedes an older one of 1972?one that had been suspended by the US since Brazil did not satisfy a newly added provision of section 128 of the Atomic Energy Act.
The amendment newly required that IAEA be allowed to implement full-scale safeguards in non-nuclear weapon states like Brazil for their continuing to be eligible for significant US nuclear exports.
But, clearly, Brazil subsequently understood which side its bread was buttered. That is why on December 13, 1991 the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABAAC), and IAEA, signed a four-sided agreement admitting the application of full-scale ?safeguards? in both these countries. This agreement came into force on March 4, 1994 and enabled the resumption of cooperation with the US.
If that was a capitulation that the Left finds inexplicable, there is worse to follow in China?s case. The provisions that it must abide by?in terms of international law?are much more onerous and intrusive. Article 2.1 states that China may not invoke the provisions of its internal laws to justify violation of the agreement. The article also lays down that Chinese exports under the agreement will have to be in line with US laws that prevail at the time of such exports.
That indeed comes as a surprise. For, India?s 123 agreement has no such provision in Article 16.4. The latter quite simply invokes good faith and the principles of international law. A second restrictive provision that applies to China, but not to India, relates to the freedom to export US nuclear material, or technology, to the signatory country. The US president must certify every such transaction; he must state that China was not assisting a third country (which had not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)) in acquiring nuclear weapons technology. Hence, no transfers would occur until the administration and congress were satisfied that China had begun to adhere to global non-proliferation norms. The US-China 123 agreement could be implemented only after president Bill Clinton had provided such a certificate to Congress on January 12, 1998?followed by the approval of the US Congress shortly thereafter.
India has been treated very differently: both the US president and Congress seem to be satisfied that New Delhi adheres strictly to all the operative provisions of the NPT despite its not being a signatory to it. That is why no restrictive provisions of the sort described above have been incorporated in the agreement with India.
Even Russia?s relationship with the Tehran regime has been unable to dissuade the US from going ahead with a 123 agreement with Moscow for civilian nuclear cooperation.
Officials from both countries concluded an agreement on civilian nuclear power on May 6, 2008. Following that, the Americans can now access Russian technology and award Moscow potentially lucrative deals on storing spent fuel.
The new 123 agreement with Russia presents an opportunity for two former nuclear rivals to share peaceful nuclear technology and combat nuclear proliferation.
In fact, as testified on June 12 before the House Foreign Affairs Committee by John Rood, acting under-secretary for arms control and international security, the agreement would enable the development of ?certain proliferation-resistant technologies?. It will also provide the US with commercial opportunities in Russia while it cemented the shared goal of non-proliferation.
Finally, it needs to be noted that the agreement comes as a bigger relief to the US than to Russia. The latter possesses state-of-the-art technology in the field?and in fuel reprocessing especially?whereas US? R&D strivings had almost ceased after the Three Mile Island disaster of 1979. The question, then, is?B, R and C of the BRIC countries seem to have chosen the right option?will ?I?, too, manage to do likewise?
