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Reddy
hints at RBI giving up supervisory role
Our
Banking Bureau
Mumbai, Oct 3: The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) deputy
governor Dr YV Reddy on Wednesday hinted at the possibility
of giving up its supervisory role over financial intermediaries.
“A beginning was made in recommending divestiture of the RBI
supervisory functions in regard to cooperative banks, which
would presumably be extended to non-banking financial companies
and later to all commercial banks,” Dr Reddy said while delivering
the second foundation day lecture at the Indian Institute
of Management (Indore).
The RBI has decided to divest its all the ownership functions
in commercial banking, development finance and securities
trading entities. The RBI also signalled initiation of steps
for separation of government debt management function from
monetary policy.
“These measures would enable the RBI to primarily focus on
its role as monetary authority and enhance the possibility
of a move towards greater autonomy,” Dr Reddy noted. The RBI
has set up an internal committee to review the existing legal
provisions in both the RBI Act and the Banking Regulation
Act so as to bring about suitable amendments in them to provide
sufficient operational flexibility to it for conducting monetary
policy, guiding the development of the financial sector and
securing the stability of the financial system as a whole.
The committee made a host of recommendations including the
issues providing the RBI the flexibility in respect of monetary
policy instruments, supervisory effectiveness, prudential
deregulation and governance of financial markets.
It has also recommended the strengthening of institutions
in the light of structural changes due to ongoing reforms
and encourage transparency and integrity of operations. In
a liberalised environment, maintaining financial stability
is an important additional objective of policy and the RBI
should have the operational skills to manage and limit the
damage on account of volatility transmitted via the international
economy.
Dr Reddy pointed out the operational constraints at the policy
level in this regard.
The continued fiscal dominance, including large temporary
mismatches between receipts and expenditures of government,
warranting large involuntary financing of credit needs of
Government by the RBI. The predominance of publicly owned
financial intermediaries and non-financial public enterprises,
which has created a blurring of the demarcation between funding
of and by government vis-a-vis public sector as a whole. The
relatively underdeveloped state of financial markets — partly
due to legal and institutional constraints — which blunts
the effectiveness of instruments of monetary policy. These
issues need to be resolved to enhance genuine autonomy.
At the operational and procedural level, there is a problem
of “old habits die hard”. In a deregulated environment, there
is considerable scope to reduce micro-management issues in
the relations between the Government and the RBI. At the level
of degree of transparency, there is a temptation to continue,
what has been termed as the “joint-family approach”.
The approach ignores basic tenets of accounting principles
in regard to transactions between RBI and Government.
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