Karunanidhi charted DMK’s ship in the wrong direction

N Madhavan

EVEN as former chief minister and DMK leader M Karunanidhi gropes in the dark to find out the cause for the poll debacle, it is becoming increasingly clear that a litany of factors seems to have contributed to his party’s defeat. Notwithstanding the fact that he is a strategist par excellence, the DMK, under his stewardship, charted a wrong course with the same amount of over-confidence that matched Titanic’s maiden voyage.

The arithmetic: Mr Karunanidhi got the numbers wrong. AIADMK leader J Jayalalitha could not have put in place the so-called ‘mega alliance’ but for the actions of the DMK leader. His attempts to create a rift among the Vanniyar vote base resulted in the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK) quitting National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and moving to the AIADMK front.

This was a coup of sorts as the AIADMK front straightaway gained an upper hand in both the north and southern parts of the state. DMK’s tie-up with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) meant that Left parties and Congress stayed away from it. While the BJP polled only 3.24 per cent of the votes, the Left and Congress parties got 12.51 per cent, and this went to the AIADMK front. In all, the AIADMK front got 49.89 per cent of the votes while the DMK front got 38.03 per cent.

Caste-based outfits: In a desperate move to improve its fortunes post-AIADMK-PMK alliance, the DMK tied-up with a whole lot of caste-based parties. These include those espousing the cause of Dalits, Yadava and the Mudaliar communities, apart from some Muslim organisations. It ignored the possible backlash from such a move, which did not go down well with the people, especially those with secular principles. They distanced themselves from this alliance so much so that almost all the leaders of these parties lost the elections. This was a clear signal from the people of Tamil Nadu that they are unlikely to fall prey to efforts to win votes by dividing people on caste lines. The DMK’s tieup with Dalit organisations isolated it from other castes which were all along supporting it.

The MDMK factor: Mr Karunanidhi grossly underestimated the MDMK’s clout. It surprised one and all when both the parties parted ways, especially in the context that the elections were heading for a close finish. A close scrutiny of the votes polled by MDMK reveals that AIADMK would not have formed the government on its own if the former had stayed with the DMK front. It would have depended on its allies. In that situation it is not clear if the Governor would have called upon Ms Jayalalitha to form the government as the mandate would have been a fractured one. By throwing out the MDMK, the DMK only hurt itself and gave credence to the Opposition claims that Mr Karunanidhi was trying to promote his son, M K Stalin, at the cost of the party.

The Stalin aspect: The DMK, which was over the years attacking the Congress for dynastic rule, began to tone down the rhetoric once it became clear that Stalin would be prepared to takeover the reigns of the party from his father.

In order to make the transition easy those who were perceived to accept Stalin as their leader were given tickets. This resulted in almost 70 sitting MLAs being denied tickets. As a result, they worked against the party’s interest which in turn contributed to the drubbing.

Mr Karunanidhi, in a bid to whip up sympathy, also stated that this would be his last election as chief minister. This proved to be counter-productive as people, barring hardcore DMK loyalists, were unprepared for the possibility of Stalin becoming chief minister and cast their lot with the other front.

Failure to read signals: The DMK government was over-confident that the people would never bring Ms Jayalalitha back to power. As a result, it failed to read the signals that emerged in the 1998 and 1999 Lok Sabha elections. On both occasions, the DMK-led front performed badly and the reasons were more local than national. The ruling party ignored these signals presuming that people would vote differently when it came to state assembly elections. But the people of the state have taught DMK a bitter lesson showing that they care more about their livelihood than corruption.

Lack of communication: Despite a relatively friendly press compared to what Ms Jayalalitha had, the DMK government failed to get its achievements across to the people. It was unable to explain to the people the reasons for the hike in prices of essential commodities, such as diesel, kerosene, sugar, LPG, rice etc., which were due to Centre’s policies. Fall in price of certain commodities due to imports affected farmers earnings but this again was not because of the local government. The DMK government failed to convey such matters to the people. Instead its media policy was Jayalalitha-centric, and this surely did not work well.