All these can now end up as just another pipedream for the services, because an important fallout of the Tehelka expose - it may have political implications for the Vajpayee government - will be the delay in the whole process of modernisation of the armed forces.

For several years following the Bofors scandal, no worthwhile decision had been taken on arms purchases. As a consequence, our ill-equipped troops had to pay with their lives during the Kargil conflict. Now, it is quite certain that following the expose everything that has been on the wish-list of the three services will probably be shelved, and the process of modernisation will remain a mirage.

Though there are prescribed procedures, and almost always followed, before any military equipment is purchased for the country, the seriousness with which these are implemented depends on the size and cost of the purchase. On a regular basis, the three services carry out perspective planning in which future military scenarios are examined and both the operational aspects and the equipment required for the armed forces in future wars are listed out.

After this the various branches of the three services are asked to shortlist the type of equipment (e.g. tanks, missiles, submarines, aircraft or light weapons) that would be required for any modern army to cope with future operation situations (like wars, insurgencies or peacekeeping).

This is the first point where middlemen representing large arms manufacturers try and influence decisions. However, as things are pretty fluid at this stage, their attempts are restricted to getting specific weapon systems shortlisted. Once the shortlist is prepared, the services carry out extensive user trials across India and the service headquarters forward their recommendations to the defence ministry. It is at this stage that large-scale lobbying takes place.

The matter now is largely with the defence minister, his few trusted bureaucrats and the odd military officer who is expected to be the link between the politico-bureaucratic lobby and the service headquarters. Such military officers are normally chosen for their otherwise impeccable integrity, but once exposed to the temptations of the arms bazaar are known to slip. Sadly, their greed tarnishes the image of the entire military community of the country.

The final choice of the military equipment to be purchased is made both on the basis of the military's requirement and the most acceptable price offered. For instance, in the heyday of the Indo-Soviet partnerships much of India's military equipment was purchased not in hard foreign currency but under a barter arrangement with the Soviets. Also, the diplomatic leverage that governments can exercise with the purchase of weapons is a matter of serious consideration. A defence minister keen to make a buck out of the deal therefore chooses a weapon that falls far short of the military's expectations.

One way or the other, the sufferers are the men in uniform, who could either be saddled with sub-standard equipment or be asked to improvise and make use of the wrong equipment purchased by self-seeking ministers and officials. A classic example of this was that of the Army's many mechanised infantry battalions that were saddled with the wrong variant of the BTR Soviet Armoured Vehicles in the 1980s, on which they were asked to fit in the modified shoulder firing variant of the faggot missiles, because these vehicles had arrived at the Bombay docks and the Army was ordered to accept them!

The Air Force, too, continues to lose young pilots on training sorties in the absence of the much-needed advanced jet trainer. Jawans on the Line of Control and in the Kashmir Valley will remain sitting ducks for kalashnikov-armed militants as they continue to crave for better night vision devices, efficient radio sets and surveillance equipment. And our Navy will remain much against its strategic vision with one aircraft carrier.

While the names exposed by Tehelka.com will continue to be in public memory for long, there is evidence to show that defence deals have been tainted by corruption in India since Independence. Whatever the assertions of this government, and once before this, it is well known that the sheer attraction of huge kick-backs has tempted many generations of Indian policy-makers operating out of South Block, who refuse to even discuss the modalities of how these choices are made on the grounds of national interest or national security.

If the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government wants to be seen as different then many heads must roll. The government must enact a law that ensures greater transparency in defence deals. And the military's modernisation has to be undertaken without further delay.

(The writer is a military analyst and regional director, MiddlesexUniversity,South Asian region)