In the first incident, after a series of positive signals from the new administration in Washington, the US state department threw a tantrum over Russian supplies of fuel for the Tarapur atomic power station that was both quixotic and gratuitous. The official spokesman at Foggy Bottom demanded of Russia to stop supplying enriched uranium to Tarapur because India does not accept the full scope of safeguards and has a "nuclear weapon programme".

The second episode, some days later, was a statement by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee that condemned the US-UK bombings of Iraq's air-defence sites close to Baghdad and demanded an end to the crippling sanctions on that country.

Between them, the two developments surely show that despite a definite improvement in relations between the most populous and most powerful democracies, it is not all hunky-dory between them. But that is incidental.

The main point is that neither incident has touched off a bitter bout of polemics between the two sides that would have been automatic and instant in olden days. Evidently, the approach on both sides has matured to the point where disagreement or even discord over one issue is not allowed to damage the overarching relationship. This is something to build on. But there is also the flip side of the coin. Despite more than a dozen rounds of talks between foreign minister Jaswant Singh and the former US deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott, India and the US haven't yet found a nuclear meeting ground. Until the nonproliferation issue is got out of the way, the full potential of the imperatives for better Indo-US relations cannot be realised, notwithstanding Indian illusions to the contrary.

Unlike Clinton, President George W Bush is not a nonproliferation enthusiast. He has thrown the CTBT that Clinton was so keen on, into the wastepaper basket. But the nuclear fundamentalists entrenched within the American establishment have their own agenda. The nuclear dialogue with the US therefore needs to be resumed without delay and carried to fruition as fast as possible. Americans know that this country's credible minimum deterrent would not disappear.

On West Asia (Middle East) in general and Iraq in particular the two sides will have to agree to disagree. The US, joined by Britain alone, will almost certainly persist in hitting Iraq and trying to topple President Saddam Hussein by hook or by crook. But there can be no escape from the harsh realities on the ground. Ten years after the Gulf War, Saddam remains firmly in the saddle and gleefully defiant. The sanctions on Iraq are in tatters.

Oil is flowing out from Iraq by road through Turkey, Jordan and Syria. More and more countries have reopened their embassies in Baghdad and numerous airlines have resumed their flights to the Iraqi capital. Above all, the international opinion is overwhelmingly against the US, in the Arab world particularly so.

The problem with President Bush's policy on West Asia - some have dubbed it "Meddle East" policy and others "Muddle East" game plan-is the total collapse of the Oslo peace process. With the ascension to power of Israel's most hawkish hawk, Ariel Sharon, the process is indeed dead. The Arab outrage is understandable. American diplomats, trying to impress on the Arabs that Saddam remains a "dangerous enemy" of neighbouring countries, have been tersely told: "Saddam is not killing the Arabs; Israel is". No wonder, according to a pithy newspaper comment, ten years after its famous victory, America now "seems lost in a Desert Storm".

For the country, America's relentlessly anti-Iraqi policy is not just a moral issue. It also involves vital Indian interests. Only a few days before Mr Vajpayee spoke out, India had signed a wheat-for-oil deal with Iraq.

There is some dismay among the Iraqis that New Delhi has not yet received the UN's endorsement for this agreement that is routinely given to other countries doing similar business with Baghdad. This needs attention.

However, overall it is good sign that New Delhi has begun to fine-tune its policies. It is no longer allowing firmness in defence of Indian interests or high principles to turn into an acrimonious crusade.