I have no complaints against comments made by the Pakistan press on the Hamoodur Rahman Commission report, analysing Islamabad's debacle in Bangladesh in 1971. Editorials and columns blamed army commanders for the `humiliation' when Pakistan surrendered.My grievance is that the real cause has not been discussed. Pakistan's press does not go far enough to find out why chauvinism in the western part was so blatant that it drowned the voice of dissent, difference and defiance in the east. Why was no accusing finger pointed at politicians who, for their power and pelf, treated leaders in East Pakistan like dirt?
Since I was witness to that era, I want to narrate something. What I am presenting in this article are facts, not fiction. I had interviewed the Bangladesh founder, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, and his finance minister, Tajuddin, as also General Mohammed Ayub and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.
"Left to me," General Ayub said in an interview, "I would have told East Bengal in 1962, when a new Constitution was introduced, that if they wanted to go they could do so. It was no use keeping them if they did not want to remain with us. In fact, once I had a plan to ask them straightaway whether they wanted to secede. Were they to say yes, that would have ended the problem then and there, but certain things came in the way and I could not go ahead with my scheme."
He is not right. Leaders in East Bengal did not favour secession. They were driven to that point. The attitude of the West Pakistan leaders did so. Way back in February 1966, Sheikh Mujib spoke of the "neglect of East Pakistan."
He wanted his part of the country to be treated at par. Lahore was where, during a meeting, he spelt out his six-point formula, which became the basis for a national struggle. In Dhaka, Tajuddin told me that the six-point programme was the "beginning and we knew we would become independent one day."
The six points were: (1) Establishment of a federation `on the basis of the Lahore Resolution' and the parliamentary framework of government; (2) transfer of all subjects to the federating states except defence and foreign affairs which the federal government would administer; (3) separate but freely convertible currencies for the two wings; (4) vesting of tax provisions in the hands of the federating states with the central government receiving a fixed share; (5) complete freedom in respect of foreign trade, including authority for the unit government to establish trade and commerce with foreign countries; and (6) authority for East Pakistan to set up its own military or para-military forces.
The foundation of Bangladesh was laid on these six points. West Pakistan tried to show that East Bengal was "the hidden hand of India". But the Bengalis had suffered exploitation and discrimination at the hands of their brethren from West Pakistan, not India.
A sign of West Pakistan's desperation was the Agartala conspiracy case (January 1968) trumped up against Sheikh Mujib. It was alleged that he was at the head of a secessionist plot, with weapons supplied by India via Agartala. To give `conspiracy' a content, Pakistan declared PN Ojha, first secretary to the Indian High Commission, persona non grata, accusing him of having attended a meeting of the `conspirators.' It was true that Sheikh Mujib, in 1965, had crossed into India when he found the going difficult in East Pakistan. But New Delhi was never a party to his leaving Pakistan. When the Indian government came to know of it, he was sent back.
The Pakistan government could not substantiate its case and had to release Sheikh Mujib unconditionally. After his release, he could say justifiably that if ever there was a conspiracy it was "against me" and that the case was designed "to sabotage the just demands of East Pakistan." The Agartala trial made the quintessence of Bengali resentment against West Pakistan.
Then onwards, Sheikh Mujib's slogan was: "We want to be the brothers of West Pakistan, not its slaves." On allegations that he was leading a secessionist movement he would say: "The six points will be realised and Pakistan shall also remain." Tajuddin told me that the autonomy movement really began with the Agartala case. "We realised we could not live with West Pakistan," he said, adding, "when we found that the allegation of conspiracy with India did not pull us down in public esteem, we were emboldened."
In the National Assembly poll (December 17, 1970), Sheikh Mujib's Awami League won 167 seats in East Pakistan. This gave the party an absolute majority in the house of 313. The Awami League did not win any seat in West Pakistan. People voted either as East Bengalis or as West Pakistanis. Sheikh Mujib, who had swept the polls on the basis of the six-point programme, now pressed for provincial autonomy. But General Yahya was not willing to part with power.
Narrating the sequence of events of those days, Sheikh Mujib told me how he was pushed to the brink where he had no alternative except to give a call for a free country, free Bangladesh. Tajuddin, who founded the emigre government of Bangladesh on April 10, 1971, and Kamal Hussain, the first Bangladesh foreign minister-the two persons who held negotiations with Lieutenant General Peerzada, Yahya's principal staff officer for a settlement-told me that West Pakistan was not sincere about parting with power.
Sheikh Mujib added that General Yahya was willing to go to the extent of having a Commonwealth of Pakistan, with the eastern and western wings as its two units. Bhutto's version was: The draft plan on which Yahya's men and Mujib's representatives worked envisaged withdrawal of martial law and transfer of power to the provinces without effecting a similar transfer of power to the central government.
The National Assembly was to be divided ab initio into two committees, one for West Pakistan and the other for Bangladesh. The committees were to prepare separate reports within a stipulated period and submit them to the National Assembly. The "two-committee proposal" contained the "seeds of two Pakistans." Hence it was not acceptable to the People's Party.
In the `Great Tragedy', Bhutto quotes Mujib as suggesting that "I (Bhutto) should become the Prime Minister of West Pakistan and he (Mujib) would look after East Pakistan... I replied that I would much rather be destroyed by the military than by history."
Copyright © 2001 Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Ltd.