The board and the unions agree with the Gopalan Committee's recommendations-and say that not all the MoST directives are based on them. According to them, only the first MoST directive follows from the Gopalan Committee's recommendations. Some unions are even thinking of going to court alleging violation of Sections 5 and 11 of the Major Port Trusts Act of 1963.

Section 5 says the ownership of assets created in a port is vested with its board and its chairman acts on its behalf. A port trust is the legal entity having power to acquire or dispose of a property, a power that even the Union government does not enjoy.

Section 11 says the Union government can issue directives to a port trust on policy matters only after discussion with its board.

The way MoST has issued the orders indicates that it was done in haste and without going through the implications. Had the MoST been serious, it would have taken the CPT board into confidence before issuing the orders.

Surprisingly, the MoST's representative on the CPT board did not attend the meeting that objected to the ministry's decision, thus forgoing a chance of interacting with the trustees to bridge the gap in perceptions. In fact, the MoST representative, who is also the second man in the ministry, was not informed about the contents of the order. At most major ports, the MoST nominees are of the rank of director, but the nominee at CPT, KR Bhatti, is an additional secretary and financial advisor to the ministry. This appointment would have given the impression that MoST was serious about CPT's problems had he been consulted before issuing the orders. Why such a senior official was bypassed remains a mystery. Further, these orders have provided a weapon in the hands of "anti-Centre" crusaders.

The basic question-how to improve the health of the CDS-cannot be addressed by anti-Centre slogans or by taking a legal route. When opponents say that "de-linking" of HDC will ruin CDS, they have a case.

HDC was developed by CPT with an aim to save the century-old Calcutta port, burdened by huge manpower and old equipment following the global trend towards containerisation of cargo mechanisation of handling. HDC is nearer the ocean mouth than the Calcutta port, and the river there is deeper.

It was decided that the new dock, with modern equipment, would handle bulk cargo like coal and oil, while break bulk cargo would be mostly handled by the CDS. Thus, its Budge Budge oil jetty gradually lost its importance.

The strategy paid off and the HDC has been doing well. On the other hand, the CDS is still financially troubled although it has increased its traffic from 7.952 million tonnes in 1997-98 to 9.163mt next fiscal and to 10.313mt in 1999-2000. It has also slashed manpower from 40,000 in 1976 to 10,500, with plans for further cuts. Since 1980, there has not been any recruitment, except for some specialised positions. Equipment is also being modernised, albeit slowly.

On the financial front, the CPT spends Rs 164 crore a year just to pay its 25,000 pensioners, most of whom retired from the CDS. Haldia, being a modern unit, employs only 5,500 people and is not likely to face that problem, while the CDS will collapse if it has to mobilise the funds in isolation.

Last year, CPT started building a pension fund (target Rs 2,200 crore) mostly by selling assets.

International experience also goes against such de-linking. Worldwide, no two ports on the same river operate separately. Compulsions of a common river regime force them to remain under common authority. For example, the Delaware River Port Authority controls Philadelphia and Camden ports in the US. The harbour master, an executive of the Port of Rotterdam (Municipal) Authority, controls several dock systems on the common river Rhine-docks in Rotterdam city, Boltek and Europoort districts.