According to Malik, the armed forces were strictly following the decision of the Union cabinet in conducting operations against the infiltrators in the Kargil sector.

``The cabinet is meeting very often and we are in attendance. We are reviewing the situation all the time. If it becomes necessary to cross the LoC in supreme national interest, the matter will be taken up with the cabinet,'' says Malik.

Defence minister George Fernandes has said that any decision, if needed, to cross the LoC in the Kargil sector would be taken at the appropriate time. He has reiterated that the armed forces were prepared to give a befitting reply to any Pakistani misadventure onIndian soil.

In the ongoing conflict in Kargil, the government of India has a self-imposed restriction of confining operations to the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC).

``The LoC has obtained for itself a symbolism that would have been unthinkable a month ago,'' says Lt Gen. (retd) V R Raghavan, former director of general military operations. According to him, crossing the LoC can only be the means to an end, and not the end in itself. There are those who feel Indian forces should have poured across the LoC, as soon as the Pakistani intrusions were noticed, he adds.

Raghavan points out that crossing the LoC would prove to be extremely costly in blood terms. It would also gift away the situation's advantage to the intruders. And if one were to go by military realities, every inch of the border cannot be possibly guarded. The second fundamental issue is that if one party to an agreement violates an essential ingredient, then the other party is not bound by that agreement any more.

``The LoC is anagreement between India and Pakistan. Once Pakistan has violated the LoC, we are free to punish him anywhere on or across the LoC and restore status quo ante. We may even exact reparations,'' says Wing Commander J Thomas, a veteran of the 1962, 1965 and 1971 wars.

A third fundamental point is that it is costly and difficult, if not impossible, to dislodge well-entrenched troops in prepared positions in the mountains. A frontal attack in the mountains requires huge superiority and will be at the expense of heavy casualties, says Thomas. Far better to cut off the supply lines from the rear.

``Keeping these fundamental points in mind, it has been a monumental strategic blunder for our political and military leadership to confine operations to the pockets of territory occupied by Pakistani intruders. It may be politically convenient, but militarily foolish and irresponsible,'' he adds.

Thus, he says, in the sub-continent, there are two extremes--a rogue army in Pakistan and a strategy-less army in India.The result is fierce fighting and heavy casualties. The valiant soldiers in the field are performing under incredible odds. It is the duty of the political and military leadership to evolve a strategy that recovers the occupied territory with minimum loss of blood and treasure, he says.

The most sensitive of these areas is a hill overlooking the Kargil valley, which contains an airfield and the town of Kargil, through which runs the Srinagar-Leh road.

`` We captured this area again in 1971 and, in deference to army sentiments, we retained it and renamed the Cease-Fire Line (CFL) as the Line of Control (LoC). Apart from occasional rhetoric about claiming the whole of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), India is generally willing to solidify the existing LoC as an international border. Thus, India is the status quoist and Pakistan is trying to ``create new facts on the ground'', says Thomas.

``In early 1949, when the CFL was drawn, it was marked on the map only up to a grid reference of NJ9842 and the CFLwas defined as ``northward to the glaciers. This was a negligent act on the part of our negotiators,'' he says.``Further, India restored only areas captured outside Jammu & Kashmir. The captured territory was retained in J&K and the CFL renamed as the LoC. Over 93,000 prisoners were held and negotiated from a position of strength. The government had all the opportunity to demarcate the boundary in the Siachen area. In fact, the CFL could have been converted into an international boundary by a legally binding treaty. But none of this was done,'' says Thomas.

According to him, the mandarins of MEA, the military brass, the political leadership and the media are equally culpable for these mistakes.

The country now has a rare opportunity to undo some of these mistakes of the past. India did not start the hostilities in the Kargil sector. Both sides are suffering heavy casualties in Siachen for no worthwhile reason. Now is the chance for India to push the intruders out and capture additional territory in asector of its choosing.

``We should then negotiate from a position of strength and insist on a solemn treaty with international participation to convert the LoC, with minor adjustments, to a full fledged international border. As a corollary, once the Siachen border is demarcated, both sides must also agree to withdraw troops to lower altitudes,'' he adds.

``Crossing the LoC is a game two sides can play,'' says Raghavan. The better answer then is that neither side should cross the LoC. How is that to be brought about? What measures--military, political or international--would ensure it? That is what Malik was indicating, when he talked about looking beyond Kargil, says Raghavan.

``When our gallant men die in battle, jingoist rhetoric follows emotions like an alter ego,'' he adds. ``Politicians play on it. The military is a vital instrument in conflict. It wins battles. A narrow focus on battles alone, however, can lose the nation the war for lasting peace.''