Investors,including mutual funds, had welcomed the idea of UTI's presence in virtually every board (given the spread of its equity investment). They are bothered about corporate governance, understandably so, in a country where industries go sick but their controlling interests flourish. Irrespective of whether their share prices are firm or weak, management leaves much to be desired in many firms. But it was also recognised that UTI would be in a minority on many boards; to be effective, it would have to be in an adverserial relationship with the controlling interests-to the detriment of smooth functioning of the companies. And where things are really bad, as a minority stakeholder, it might rarely secure board majority to enforce a change in management. True, UTI could join hands with nominee directors of term-lending institutions, but the interests of investor and lender may not always coincide. UTI's alternative of selling equity of firms with recalcitrant managements would work only if disinvestment exceeded wellover five per cent; modest sales would not bother managements with ulterior motives. Besides, UTI, like other funds, is gradually bringing its investments to 10 per cent of equity of firms. A related point is that membership on boards is likely to expose UTI to charges of insider trading, unless information presented to the board is simultaneously released, as in US, to the Press and public. The key issue is transparency, and not just passing on relevant information to equity analysts of UTI. Like UTI, other mutual funds, and individual investors should enjoy interface with corporates. Crony capitalist relationship with powerful institutions must be thwarted. UTI can only speak for itself; Sebi should take up from where UTI has left off.