The infiltration of nearly a thousand mercenaries in the mountains of Kargil and Dras areas is an event of great worry for the people of the Indian subcontinent. For it signifies that there are elements in Pakistan who are yet to absorb the logic of `nuclearisation' of the subcontinent that took place a year ago.

But given the stranglehold of non-specialists and Delhiwallas on the media (many a time the two are co-terminus), it is essential to get some basic facts straight. First and foremost, all this talk of sealing the border is military nonsense. In best of times, infiltration cannot be prevented even in the plains; in the mountains, it is an impossibility. Obviously one has to be vigilant about the rear areas, but again this is not always feasible. The best way to deal with this threat is to keep reserves in the rear. Thethree steps of this process are contain, isolate and then destroy. It seems clear that we are only at stage two at this point in time. Though stage three may have begun with the entry of the IAF to clear the intruders.

Tactically, the incursion is of no great significance. The intruders have not cut off any road axis. The shelling of road traffic may become easier due to the enhanced observation that the new positions provide. But that is nothing new. The Kargil road was always under Pakistani observation. It is just one such road, and all along the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir there are literally hundreds of places where Indian or Pakistani road communications are both under observation as well as within the range of guns.

Does this mean that the Kargil affair should not be taken seriously? The answer is a resounding: NO. It is indeed a grave matter because of the provocation and the fact that the enemy seemed confident to pull it off. This indirectly poses a direct challenge to the Indian notionof `deterrence' and cannot be left unchallenged.

The Kargil incident comes as a rude shock to those analysts who have been predicting an era of `armed peace' between India and Pakistan after the two went overtly nuclear. It is instructive to compare this with the situation at the `Berlin Wall' throughout the cold war. There, at the famous `Checkpoint Charlie', American soldiers used to man it with mere sidearms, but the other side never violated the rules of the game. The understanding was that behind that lone American soldier stood the nuclear might of the US. Obviously India has over the years failed to establish these rules of the nuclear game.

A charitable, and plausible explanation, is that the Kargil intrusion was a low level initiative. But the numbers involved do not support this theory. Instead it may well be that it is the Pakistani army's initiative, an army that is opposed to the Lahore peace process. Given the near autonomous nature of the Pakistani army, this is extremely dangerous for thefuture of India and the world. For now this adventurous army has its fingers on the nuclear button.

The Pakistani army has, in the past, been known to do this. About a year ago, a brigadier had engineered an incursion in the Baramulla sector. In addition, the Pakistanis may well have been encouraged by the political instability in India. In this context, it is shocking that the Sonia Congress seems to want to take political mileage out of it. The Nato bombing campaign against Yugoslavia may also have influenced the Pakistani thinking. Most Pakistanis have been pleased at the support Nato is extending to the secessionist movement in Kosovo.

The most important lesson of this episode, however, is the peep it gives us and the world into the Pakistani psyche. Military rationale clearly dictates that Pakistan stands to gain no lasting advantage, and that the infiltrators are bound to be bombed out and eliminated unless the regular Pakistani army is prepared to cross over and come to their aid. In the 1965Indo-Pak war, Pakistan had dropped paratroopers near airfields in Punjab. They had no hope of a linkup or success and were rounded up. But the fact remains that such a militarily foolhardy course was adopted. Even in 1971, the attack on the Western front was an invitation to disaster, but yet Yahya Khan did it on December 3, 1971. The Kargil incident shows that nuclearisation has not changed the age-old mindset.

If there is no drastic change in this Pak psyche and adventuresome behaviour, the Indian subcontinent and the world is headed for a crisis similar to the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962--when Khruschev tested the US resolve to defend itself against the provocation of citing Russian missiles in Cuba. The weakness of Indian policy-making is in embracing a notion that peace, military and political goals are separate.

The Delhi think-tanks have also been guilty of fostering a climate of `stalemate' and the argument that there is no alternative to peace. This shows a bankruptcy of thinking asthere are several alternatives between all-out war and inactivity. Unless India devises these viable alternatives that give enough `punishment', Pakistan is likely to continue to test the limits of Indian tolerance.

`Kargils' will continue to happen in future unless we draw an unambiguous `Laxman rekha' of our tolerance and be prepared to enforce it. There is no room for partisan politics in this issue of national survival. Unless we want to go through the experience of the Cuban missile crisis in the Indian subcontinent. But that is dangerous with new evidence coming to light that the world was saved from nuclear holocaust not by sage statesmanship alone but by sheer luck!

The author is a Pune-based defence analyst