In the past, support from the Consolidated Fund of India was substantial. It went up to 75 per cent of the railways' annual plan in the 1970s. Since then it has beenwaning, and in 1998-99, it came down to only 22 per cent.In quantitative terms, the general exchequer will provide only Rs 1,831 crore of a total railway plan of Rs 8,300 crore during 1998-99. On the other hand, the share of market borrowings has increased to 29 per cent, and that of internal generation of funds to 46 per cent by 1998-99. This trend, as indicated by the figures, must be considered to be healthy because the centre cannot be expected to continue to financially support the railways at any higher level. Moreover, the internal generation of resources has to increase.

In this process, the railways will need to be encouraged by the centre by agreeing to certain measures as proposed in the status paper including enhancement of fares and even freight in selected areas and under favourable circumstances, modernization of operations by adoption of modern methods, technology and energy efficient rolling stocks, reduction of redundant manpower through VRS schemes and recruitment, and training oftechnically qualified staff. Many of these will be bold steps indeed, and the government will have to muster the political will to adopt such means. A multi-pronged and disaggregated strategy will have to be adopted to successfully implement a railway plan commensurate with the hopes and aspirations of different sections of the people from various regions of a vast country. The basic tenet of such a strategy should be to assign the highest priority to commercial viability, albeit with a clearly spelt out policy regarding projects in identified backward and remote regions.

If this strategy is accepted, certain structural changes will be necessary so that the railway plan can be properly and adequately financed. For example, projects in the backward and remote areas will have to be fully provided for by the centre. Considerations of national security and integrity would dictate that projects in the north-east are taken up on a priority basis, although some of these projects may not be strictly commerciallyviable. However, it may not be advisable to make the railways alone finance such projects.

Anew structural arrangement will be necessary in the metropolitan areas. The Mumbai suburban lines carry half the daily passenger traffic on the entire railway system in the country. If anything happens to the two main lines in India's premier metropolis and its far-flung suburbs, Mumbai will be paralysed. Even under normal circumstances, Mumbai deserves to be treated on a special footing. To finance new projects, and to run the existing facilities, a separate autonomous body was proposed to be established.

Such an arrangement is welcome and should be put in position as early as possible, the only modification being that the cash-rich Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation should also join in this autonomous body. Such an arrangement will relieve the railways from single-handedly bearing the heavy subsidy on suburban fares. . In particular areas, specially designed bodies will have to be created to tackle problemspeculiar to such areas. The Konkan Railways can be cited as an example. It has accomplished a very major and difficult task quite efficiently and expeditiously. This successful experiment can be duplicated in a number of other areas. In the remaining areas of the country, railway development will have to be financed along traditional lines. The present pattern of contribution from the general exchequer and internal generation of funds will have to continue along with public borrowings. While the Railway Board should remain in overall charge of co-ordination and policy planning at the macro level, a disaggregated structure should be devised for running the administration, and for financing of projects in different areas based on particular needs and special problems.