Several features of India’s Parliamentary system weaken the middle link in this chain. First, if the government doesn’t introduce something, it will likely never be debated — no matter how many in Parliament or the public they represent would want a Bill to be tabled. Only 2½ hours per week are available to discuss private members’ Bills and resolutions. The restriction is not particularly unusual: the Greek Parliament debates private members’ Bills once a month, and the UK allocates just 5% of the time in session to this. And the rule makes sense in large parliaments in which a cacophony of Bills could bring all policymaking to a halt. But it does mean that there is no back-up plan if the government is not acting.

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Second, the parliamentary process limits non-government input on amendments and in reviewing the Bills before they are voted on. The Parliament has a number of committees in charge of reviewing policies, actions, and expenditures ex post, but limited scope to review and amend them before they pass. Committees elsewhere not only have the resources to mount effective critiques, but the fact that they last over time enables them to build the political capital and expertise to bargain with the ministries on any one issue. To make it worse, any amendments that the committees do suggest must be Cabinet-approved.

Third, MPs—even members of the ruling coalition—have little room for constructive criticism: options are to issue a non-binding and non-forceful statement, or the “nuclear option” of bringing down the government. Neither makes for a credible threat: the first because it is not a threat, the second because threatening to destroy one’s own position of power lacks credibility. The options for holding up the Budget, one of the most crucial pieces of legislation, are especially limited: a failed Budget proposal is automatically a vote of no confidence.

There is no back-up plan when the government doesn’t or can’t act

Paradoxically, the government’s constant need to demonstrate majority support means that policies that a majority supports can fail: they have to attract the support of a particular majority—the government—not just any majority in Parliament. And it can also mean that policies a minority supports can pass: in coalition governments, a strident minority can demand what it likes if it holds the power to bring down the government and can convince others that it will do so.

The cumulative effect: there is no back-up plan when the government doesn’t or can’t act. The opposition can behave irresponsibly; if the system prevents them from acting constructively, then who is to blame? As for citizens, pending the election cycle, they seek redressal through any alternative that has a chance of working, whether this means supporting interventions by an unelected Supreme Court operating beyond its Constitutional territory, pleading with unelected civil servants, or walking into a local government engineer’s office and yelling at him.

There is need for concerted action even in the balance time left for this government. Some institutional changes are inescapable. This would at least enable some other force for policy movement than the Government. And it would put the onus on the opposition to act, since excuses would be gone.

First, permit more time for floor suggestions. Sweden, for example, allows all members to introduce of Bills on any topic in the 15 days around the time of the Budget Bill. This kind of change, in conjunction with some distinction between “disagreement” and “no confidence”, would allow better legislation. For better and worse, it would also put the government on the spot if it had to explicitly vote down a popular policy.

Second, explicitly separate disagreements on one policy, from disagreements on all policies. Most other Parliamentary democracies make some distinction between criticism and no confidence. Germany, Spain and (since 1995) Belgium, for example, require an explicit constructive vote of no confidence in which the Parliament elects a new government simultaneously with dismissing the old.

Third, most importantly, MPs should vote themselves some research support. This will also reduce their helpless dependence on the very bureaucracies whom they want to hold accountable. This means outside experts, interest groups, and others. Filling this missing link will improve governance.

—Former top bureaucrat NK Singh and senior infrastructure specialist Jessica Wallack are working jointly on a book on reforms in India. These are their personal views