Schelling on nuclear deterrence

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Two Nobel prize winning economists, Michael Spence and Thomas Schelling, discuss nuclear weapons in Mr Counterintuition, by Michael Spence [hyperlink]: Tom, my PhD thesis adviser at Harvard, received the Nobel Prize in economics for the originality and impact of his applications of game theory to negotiation, nuclear deterrence, global warming and the surprising effect of preferences for diversity on the composition of neighbourhoods. If Tom’s work has a leitmotif, it is counterintuition.

[Over lunch], it was clear to me that Tom was deeply worried that in the post-Soviet period, the isolation of the newly arrived owners of weapons would lead to seriously inadequate strategic preparation, and therefore imperfect deterrence, and the risk of miscalculation or misuse. “Except for the end of World War II and the devices exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear devices have not been used, and we have come to understand that they are useful for deterrence and not for anything else. Part of the learning process is learning to be deterred.” Iran and North Korea probably think they need nuclear weapons to prevent being attacked by us or others hostile to them. They need to learn that success in this limited objective consists of never using them. Our conversation turns to present times... Terrorists, Tom insists, “also need to understand that nuclear devices are really only useful for deterrence. They would be unlikely to have the capacity to deliver them on planes or missiles, and would be more likely to smuggle them into a hostile country and... then threaten to detonate them if attacked—or unless their aims and conditions are met. The object should be not to blow up a city but to deter attacks on [them].” It’s counterintuitive. one has a powerful strategic interest in the sophistication of one’s enemies. ...

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