It’s economics, stupid

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The Indo-US nuclear deal may not be concluded during the current US administration.  In two months, the Bush administration will become a “lame-duck” in the run-up to the impending elections to the White House. The Indian government led by PM Manmohan Singh seems none-too-keen either to risk a general election over the deal. It is perhaps time to look beyond the deal that never was.

The US-India Civil Nuclear Co-operation Initiative, as it is called, has managed to iron out several issues that have caused annoyance to both New Delhi and Washington in the past. As the joint statements of July 2005 and March 2006 declared and the 123 Agreement of July 2007 undertook, India will identify its civilian and military nuclear establishments and bring the former under IAEA supervision for the first time since 1974; India further pledged to conform to the NPT and the CTBT without having to sign these. In return, the US will repeal all remaining sanctions against the Indian nuclear establishment, facilitate the exchange and transfer of nuclear technology, and will help India gain access to nuclear fuel from its accredited global suppliers, the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Another dimension is that some US foreign policy experts see the deal’s ultimate benefit as securing India as a strategic ally in South Asia to create a regional counterpoise to China’s growing clout in the Indian Ocean region. One of the components of this containment strategy pertains to policing the high seas. China’s ventures of upgrading its ‘green-water navy’ (operating within territorial waters) into a ‘blue-water navy’ (capable of operating on high seas), its increasing presence in Africa and construction of a $1.16-billion port in Gwadar, Pakistan—all these factors are likely to increase Chinese capability of threat projection considerably in the Indian Ocean region. Tied down in the Persian Gulf, the US needs some allies taking over some of its responsibilities in the Indian Ocean region, and India is considered to be most suited for the purpose, given the size of its own ‘green-water navy’. It is, therefore, argued that the nuclear deal presages a relationship of considerable strategic depth, laying to rest the unpleasant memories of the Cold War era, characterised by US suspicion of, and opposition to, India’s nuclear programme. Bypassing the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Indo-US nuclear deal is meant to signify US confidence in India’s capability to behave like a responsible nuclear power.