In 1998, like 1994, it is man-made because Surat never completed the embankment walls alongside the Tapi allowing a gush of water, because it could not clean up the heavy silting in the river bed leading to an overall ascent of its base and because the city is yet to be equipped with an exhaustive storm-water drainage system. It is not man-made because the warnings were issued in time, because evacuation began promptly and because the flow of water would have thrown into disarray all reasons that could make the 1998 flood an invited guest.

The city of dreams, as it is fondly termed, Surat has seen more nightmares than all the riches it is known for. But still, the city which has moredisposable cash than it can actually dispose is still to completely wall up its flood-prone river. In at least three to four places, the Tapi's embankment walls have not been built completely and the State Government suspended its construction some years before 1994 claiming it was expensive and of little use in case of a heavy flood.

The fact remains that this time the waters entered the city from the same areas of Ved Road and Katargam, as they had in 1994, where embankments either do not exist or are breached. True, as official sources at Surat Collectorate and Surat Municipal Corporation argue, the water released was so strong that the embankments may not have withstood the pressure. But, others argue it could have at least delayed water from entering the city. There is no plan to reconstruct and construct the walls.

Secondly, no exhaustive study has yet been initiated to measure the extent of silting in the Tapi which has been exacerbated by spewing of wastes and presence of three bridges, includinga submersible one, in close vicinity. Admits SMC's consulting Surat City Engineer PC Shah that silting had levelled up the Tapi but says the corporation has now initiated a desilting scheme. Again, he also says nature's fury would have thrown even this into insignificance.

And ironically, the city that got the sobriquet of the dirtiest and then of being among the cleanest still doesn't have storm-water drains in 60 per cent of its municipal areas, though efforts have begun. As a result, as the flood situation improves the water would take time getting out; in 1994 it remained stagnant for four to five days after it had all stopped. What followed was a scary epidemic, described as the plague. Whether it repeats now remains to be seen. The only difference is that the existing drainage system is more clean this time.

Sources in the Union Government's Central Water Commission (CWC), which warns of floods developing in the catchments of Tapi in Madhya Pradesh, said warnings had been passed on in advance andthat they had been acted upon promptly. Ashok Kumar of CWC told this paper over phone that by 7.30 am on September 15 the Ukai authorities were informed that a ``flood of 17,500 cusecs is developing near Burhanpur and would bring in 2,500 million cubic metres (mcm) of water to the Ukai dam after 40 to 50 hours, and when fully developed it would be 4,000 mcm.''

Asked if this wasn't inadequate in view of the intensity, Kumar explained that the flood had been predicted by the CWC and informed to Ukai when it had developed only about 40 to 45 per cent and water was to reach Ukai after 40 to 50 hours later. He said the release from Ukai had started within two hours of information reaching them and that it had been released gradually to avoid a flood.

``This time, if they allowed the dam level to go up to 346 feet, one feet over its full reservoir level (FRL), it was only a little less in 1994. But what worsened the situation this time was the heavy rain in the catchments of Ukai dam, which only added it allup,'' he said. Kumar said there could not be any system to gauge the extent of a sudden cloudburst in the dam's catchments. So, at one point of time, when CWC told Ukai six lakh cusecs water will come, what came was much more.