Speaking too much, too soon

Our efforts to cosy up to the US are inappropriately articulated

R Jagannathan

Barring a few, most commentators appear to have got it wrong. Soon after the September 11 attacks, Indians were jubilant. The Indian media went ga-ga speculating on how the Pakistanis had managed to isolate themselves in this new war. The Indian government went a step further and promised unconditional support for any US action against terrorists, never mind that not much had been asked for.

All this shows how naive we are when it comes to developing a well-nuanced foreign policy. We spoke too much, too soon. In the process, we have given the impression that we don’t understand either our core interests or the motivations of our enemies and friends, and we don’t pause to think what the best policy is in any given situation. The past few years are supposed to have made Indian foreign policy less ideology-driven and more influenced by long-term interests. I find little evidence of this.

One Congress worthy recently excoriated the NDA for deviating from the Nehru foreign policy line. Actually, the opposite seems to be the case. Nehru often decided foreign policy emotionally; on the basis of third world morality or what appeared just and fair. This government may be falling into the same trap. During the cold war, we rushed to condemn US or Western actions without thinking through the consequences. We now appear to be eager to tell the Americans that everything they do is fine. For example, when the Bush administration expounded its missile defence plans, only New Delhi rushed to praise the idea. The US’ traditional allies, Europe and Japan, were in no hurry to do so. Consequently, not only did our support fail to register as a definite plus in the minds of the Americans, but it also created unnecessary doubts in the minds of old allies like Russia and rivals like China.

The same thing appears to be happening with the post-September 11 policy of offering all-out support to the US in its ‘war against terrorism’. By jumping in to support the US and offering logistical help, India achieved two things that are counterproductive. One, we chose to wear our anti-terrorist credentials on our sleeves, thus marking ourselves out for retribution by jihadis. We could have done what needed to be done quietly. Two, we have pushed Pakistan into a desperate situation where it has again become a frontline state willing to protect US interests.

The point is not that India should not cosy up to the US or anybody else — that policy is quite all right — but how it should achieve that aim. By rushing in where angels fear to tread, our foreign policy establishment seems to have let its heart rule over the head. It will now have to sheepishly wipe the egg off its face.

What would have been a more sensible policy to follow? It depends on how we assess ground realities. The fact is that in the specific war that the US has chosen to fight against the Taliban and Osama bin Laden, Pakistan is of more use than India. So, Pakistan’s bargaining position may be better than ours, atleast in the short-term. The US may have chosen to sup with the devil in its fight against what it considers a greater evil, but India should have expected that anyway. It’s all right for Jaswant Singh to talk of a “concert of democracies” but the Americans are in a mood for fisticuffs; till that appetite is sated, they will tear up any tickets for the concert Jaswant Singh may send them in advance.

As for Pakistan, no Indian policymaker should have illusions about its prime focus. The Pakistani establishment would sell its grandmother to embarrass or harm India. So, sacrificing the Taliban or Osama should also have been expected. A cool-headed analysis by our foreign policy establishment would have thrown up the same conclusion. We could have avoided the embarrassment of offering help where it was not particularly sought.

Third, and most important, it is necessary to understand that the global battle against terrorism will have to be fought by India, in India. No grand coalition of democracies will come to our rescue. We may get moral support and some ammunition from US and other victims of terrorism, including Israel, but we have to fight the battle ourselves. Our policymakers know this, but somehow they have let the public believe that America is going to ride out in our defence after the WTC attacks.

Nothing is lost yet. We may have made fools of ourselves, but the world loves fools. Once the US establishment realises that getting Osama will not end terrorism at home, they will see India’s support in a new light. This does not mean conducting a passive foreign policy. Jaswant Singh can continue to organise his “concert of democracies” at the UN and elsewhere. But the government would be better off protecting its interests, no matter how the US behaves in the short-run. In the long-run, it is our economic attractiveness, not our terror-fighting abilities, that will bring the US to our side.