Fear of a US-Pak diplomatic romance is sheer paranoia

Rohit Bansal

Ask your resident couch potato, who thinks he can “think”.
He was “fine” until US secretary of state Colin Powell burnt the wires calling Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf, within hours of Tuesday’s bombings, giving Pakistan “an opportunity to prove itself”.
He was “understanding”, when US president George Bush asked the White House operator to put him through to the Chinese president, several days before he—”finally”— spoke to our Prime Minister.

He became “disconcerted” by the time Gen Powell began thanking Pakistan for offering to help. (India figured “much later”).

He became “bloody disconcerted”, even “distraught and depressed”, when external affairs minister Jaswant Singh “finally” made it on CNN as belatedly as Sunday saying—and we dare paraphrase—India will play its part in the “concert”, but the US hasn’t yet ask us yet. No 1,2,3,4. No dhobi list on how India is needed in ‘Operation Noble Eagle’.

Welcome to “Kaun Banega Eaglet”, the hippest paranoia in town. Not on Star Plus. But fed on hours of zapping CNN, MSNBC, BBC, and Star News. A desperate bleary-eyed scram to piece together the bits and pieces. Instant tutorials on historiography of the Taliban.
Deciphering sound bytes and glib analyses. Passing on new breaks via SMS (short messaging system) messages, like “bn ldn in indnsia”. (Wrong story, incidentally!). Splitting hair over US vice president Dick Cheney’s diplomatese. “What Colin Powell ‘actually’ meant,” you know. Indeed fast forwarding to “World War-III”. Effortlessly. Right here. At home, sipping tea.

In short, every “thinking” couch potato today has a definitive blue-print on this nation’s foreign policy: Why the US doesn’t care for India (in this war). Why isn’t George Bush talking to the PM every three hours. Why is India just an eager beaver. Why have Gen Musharraf and Team outsmarted Mr Vajpayee, Jaswant Singh, and Brajesh Mishra. Etcetera.

On all this and more, we pick up some popular fears. And offer their counter, sans paranoia. The underlying thought being that we may be doing just the right things, for a change. And why, try as he might, Gen Musharraf isn’t riding a diplomatic coup against us on the back of ‘Operation Noble Eagle’.

Fear 1: That Pakistan will get, one, a retirement of $30 billion of debt, and two, US intervention on Kashmir.

Counter: These messages were not communicated to Wendy Chamberlin, US envoy in Islamabad, but to the media instead. Obviously, Gen Musharraf has been addressing his domestic audience. Who knows if this bluster will cut any ice with the US state department?

Fear 2: That Mr Bush spoke to Mr Vajpayee much later than China, and he did not specify what help the US wanted. Counter: We might be giving what the US wants, say, sharing intelligence and input that can help it piece the mozaic together. It is a fact that the US sees ‘Noble Eagle’ in the long haul. Al Quaida alone is a terrorist MNC spread across three dozen countries. Clearly, US plans—including a legally more sound co-option of United Nations Peace Keeping forces—are still under formulation. So, how can something that isn’t formulated be shared with India.? Also, Mr Bush hasn’t gone overboard speaking to France and Britain either. Are they, therefore, any less of an ally? Indeed, Mr Bush hasn’t asked for formal assistance from NATO too.

Fear 3: That at the end of ‘Noble Eagle’, Gen Musharraf will walk away with US gratitude.

Counter: Far from it, Gen Musharraf’s deliberate and negotiatory manner is something US is ignoring for want of better option. The headlines show he is pretty worried of being squeezed between a rock and a hard thing. So, bargain as Gen Musharraf, what really matters, from the US point of view, is what Gen Powell said at the first instance: “Pakistan has the opportunity to prove itself”. So, it isn’t words, but physical acts which hold the key for Gen Musharraf.

Fear 4: That if all was well between the US and India, why isn’t there more of this in the press?

Counter: This is a function of our paranoia. War diplomacy isn’t conducted through press statements. A hard line, often confusing statements, are essential from Pakistan’s point of view, because as former Indian Ambassador to Islamabad G Parthasarthi puts it: “Gen Musharraf is trying to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. He is trapped. So, he is trying to balance between the so-called jehadis on the one hand, and the Americans on the other”.

India has no such compulsion. Indeed, it today has the great opportunity of having the world’s only superpower joining its battle. Indo-US relations are better than never before in their history. So why should India—or the US—conduct any sensitive co-operation through the press?

What then is the message for the “thinking” couch potato? Simple enough. Mr Parthasarthi calls it the “refusal to get paranoid about American attempts to co-opt Pakistan to deal with the Taliban menace”.

So let’s try give up our Pakistan-centric obsession, as also our fears vis-a-vis the US, no sooner Gen Musharraf endears himself to Mr Bush, via ‘Noble Eagle’.

The couch potato in Britain or France is far more self-assured. He assumes his government and the US are co-operating at the highest levels, even if he doesn’t see too much of it on television. We, too, should trust our guys out there. Thereby, ourselves too.