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Reading the tea leaves of ratings
To alter perceptions, evolve a strategy
of meaningful reforms
S.S.
Tarapore
The
inevitable has happened. International credit rating agencies
have downed the hammer on India’s rating. We all knew that
there was nothing new in the rationale behind the downgrade.
Then why the official outrage and the almost subservient support
of the official position by industry associations? The media
however, barring a few exceptions, has shown considerable
maturity and judgement in advocating a sensible response to
the downgrade.
The strength of the external payments position is unprecedented,
with virtually all the key parameters reflecting resilience.
But obviously that is not the central concern of the rating
agencies. External payments crisis never emanate suo moto
from the external sector; the problems always are in the weaknesses
in the domestic economy. In today’s integrated economy, the
international propagation of economic cycles is much faster
but these factors invariably impinge on an already weakened
domestic economy.
We need make no pretence that our domestic economy is free
from problems. The combined fiscal deficit in the current
financial year could well exceed 10 per cent of GDP and government
debt could approach 70 per cent of GDP. These are serious
warning signals. To talk of self-fulfilling prophecies and
fiscal bashing as being hazardous and therefore to blind ourselves
to these problems can only aggravate an already difficult
situation.
About a year ago, there was great hope that the Fiscal Responsibility
and Budget Management Bill would be quickly enacted. Subsequent
developments have, however, totally belied such expectations.
Quite apart from populist pressures for larger spending, influential
economists have been raving about the joys of pump priming
and further reductions in interest rates. These are dangerous
ideas and any move towards pump priming and further reducing
interest rates would be a standing invitation to international
rating agencies to further downgrade India.
We can say that we don’t care about rating agencies and that
foreign investors will continue to invest, but the harsh reality
is that there could be an eerie parallel between 1990-91 and
today. Of course, we could proudly assert that we have $44
bn of forex reserves and, that all our external debt parameters
are very favourable but equally, we must be aware that the
economy is more open than what it was in 1990-91 and that
weaknesses in the domestic economy could rapidly spill over
to the external sector.
If we want to have a proper Le defi Indien (the Indian challenge)
then we should not make the Fiscal Responsibility Bill a political
issue. The role of the Opposition should be to strengthen,
not dilute, the proposed fiscal discipline. The purpose should
not merely be to satisfy international rating agencies but
to bring about fiscal rectitude which would transmit proper
signals through the economy.
India, like any other country, is subject to industrial cyclical
problems. The issue is not excess savings but over investment.
In India ‘over investment’ is misunderstood. It does not mean
that the country is not consuming enough and investing more
than required; it means that consumption is excessive and
therefore, savings are inadequate. Savings match investment
through ‘forced savings’ which is nothing but an injection
of created money. It is thus dangerous to go for pump priming.
To the extent we wish to remove bottlenecks in the economy,
we have to locate areas with excess capacities and reduce
investment in these sectors; and step up investments in areas
with capacity shortages. In other words, we need to rectify
‘malinvestment’. This is the only way of kick starting the
economy; the printing press is not the answer.
The other major area where early action is required is the
financial sector. We need to stop monkeying around with the
interest rate structure. Excessive reductions in interest
rates only attenuate the banks/financial institutions (FIs),
promote unviable investments and punish the saver, generating
disequilibrium in the economy. In a capital-short economy
real interest rates need to be significantly higher than in
industrial countries, though admittedly real interest rates
should not be higher than the real rate of growth.
The financial legislative changes sought to be implemented
should not be blocked in Parliament. It is proved beyond a
doubt that public ownership of banks/FIs and efficiency of
operations are mutually inconsistent. As Reserve Bank governor
Jalan has cogently argued, the public sector character of
banks need not be given up while reducing the public sector
ownership from the present minimum of 51 per cent to 33 per
cent, as recommended by the Narasimhan Committee.
There is a pressing need to lighten the regulatory framework
while making supervision effective. Regulation/supervision
have to become highly specialised. After all, we do not expect
a physician to undertake skilled surgery. Likewise it is high
time we recognise that generalists cannot be regulators/supervisors.
We are dealing with a relatively deregulated financial system
and if the financial system has to be safeguarded from explosive
crises, regulation/supervision of market activity has to be
proactive and not reactive.
Lastly, if we are to generate international confidence in
our economy our exchange controls, particularly on the capital
account, have to move away from meaningless controls on small
transactions of individuals. Freeing of individual resident
capital transactions within reasonable limits –– say, upto
$25,000 per year — would provide favourable external perceptions
which no other measure can; but would our authorities earn
this effortless mileage? I doubt it!
We can be indifferent to international opinion only at our
own peril. This is a costly lesson we learnt in 1991 and we
need to avoid the same mistake ten years on. Using attack
dog tactics of yesteryear to set out self-serving tosh would
only convince investors that a full-blown crisis is in the
air. We need to evolve a strategy of meaningful reforms to
alter the perceptions of rating agencies.
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