Siachen can be solved by formally demarcating India, Pakistan positions

Huma Siddiqui

While Pakistan continues to harp on the UN Resolutions on Kashmir, it has not carried out its part of the implementation, says Maroof Raza, a military analyst. In a talk given recently as part of the Mayo Heritage Society’s series of lectures at New Delhi, Mr Raza said the implementation was to be done in three parts: a) a ceasefire between Indian and Pakistani troops in 1948; b) Pakistan, as the aggressor, was to withdraw its forces (both regular and irregular) from the entire territory of J&K. The resolution, however, accepted that India could retain part of its troops in Kashmir. And only if this clause was implemented by Pakistan, would the final part of the Security Council Resolution become binding on India; and c) the future status of J&K was to be determined in accordance with the will of its people (the term plebiscite was not formally used in this resolution).

The Karachi Agreement of July 27, 1949 delineated and demarcated a ceasefire line. Recently, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said that the resolution had lost its relevance. While the Ceasefire Line was a military divide, the Line of Control was meant to be a political divide. Therefore, at Simla, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Indira Gandhi had agreed that: “In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control (LoC) resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations....”
According to P N Dhar, former secretary to Indira Gandhi and a member of the Indian delegation at Simla, there was an understanding between Mr Bhutto and Mrs Gandhi that the LoC would gradually be endowed with the ‘characteristics of an international border’. Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) would be gradually incorporated into Pakistan and the LoC treated as a de facto frontier until the Kashmir issue was resolved. Mr Bhutto, however, later denied that this was agreed upon. But measures to integrate the northern areas into Pakistan could support Mr Dhar’s version. However, no official documentation is available to confirm this understanding.

Following the Shimla Accord, the LoC was delineated after nine meetings that preceded the signing of the document. In the entire exercise, two sets of maps, each comprising 27 maps, were prepared. The marked maps were joined and 19 mosaics were prepared, clearly delineating the entire stretch of LoC running through 740 km. The delineated LoC was jointly prepared and signed by two senior military commanders, Lt Gen PS Bhagat and Lt Gen Hammed Khan. These were signed and exchanged by the two senior military commanders on December 11, 1972 at Suchetgarh.

The LoC traverses some 740 km from the international border in the south up to NJ 9842 from which, in accordance with the unchanged definition of the parent 1949 Karachi Agreement, it must run ‘thence north to the glaciers’. That is a clear enough indication, said Mr Raza, that the area was always with India. However, Pakistan sought to alter this position. By the Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement of 1963, the Shaksgam Valley in northern J&K was ceded by Pakistan to China. Since 1984, India and Pakistan have been battling it out at the Siachen glacier, an area that falls beyond the LoC.

In the 70s and the 80s several international maps depicted the Siachen Glacier as part of Pakistan. The source of this cartographic encroachment was said to be some maps that were initially produced by the US Defence Mapping Agency which depicted the LoC running from the vicinity of NJ 9842 northeast to the Karakoram Pass. The best explanation appears to lie in the possible ‘translation’ of Air Defence Information Zone markings (ADIZ), which provides zoning boundaries for air controllers in civil/military aviation, into an extension of the LoC from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass. There can be several ADIZ’s that could pass through one country, said Mr Raza.
But a military solution to the Siachen dispute can be found, feels Mr Raza. Both sides can agree to formal demarcation of their positions as it exists today, called the Actual Ground Position Line, as was done with the LoC, of course, with joint patrolling.