D Subbarao was guided by the central banks old guard into not cutting key rates in the October 24 policy review. There have also been reports that RBIs subsequent action was prompted by government intervention. Group-think in RBI seems to be centred around the proposition that India was and remains inflation prone and that monetary easing now will undo the good work of conservative policy. The dangerous thing about this, to paraphrase Keynes, is that RBIs policy staff are not letting their minds change even though facts have changed. Post-crisis, plenty of peopleespecially efficient market/minimal government advocatesare abandoning group-think and looking for heterodox solutions. RBI may have had facts to support its monetary hardline thesis earliereven this is debatable, however; this newspaper contested itbut clearly theres evidence now requiring a change of stance. It seems though that just as the US Fed in the months before the crisis was hooked on to the idea of never-faltering financial markets, RBI in the weeks after the crisis cant let go of the overheated economy idea.
How might this change Many of RBIs policy staff are employees who have spent decades in the institution and are, therefore, particularly vulnerable to group-think. It wont be easy for governor Subbarao to change that, especially since he doesnt have outsider deputies who will help the boss ram through reform. The lobby against RBI reform is RBI. Whats the lobby for RBI reform Maybe the way to go is to reduce RBIs powerstake debt management and bank regulation away, as committees have rightly suggested. But will an RBI with the just core function of monetary management be more hospitable to occasional unconventional wisdom Theres no guarantee.